Spain is different. The slogan, which the tourism industry used in the 1950s to celebrate the country’s identity and culture, is nowadays something of a joke. Among Spaniards, the old line is an expression of self-deprecation, of a sentiment of quirkiness and inferiority, which constitutes a fundamental part of the Spanish ethos. When it comes to funding mortgages, however, Spain is different in a good way.
Tuesday, November 30, 2010
Monday, November 29, 2010
Sunday, November 28, 2010
The Audacity of Greed: How Private Health Insurers Just Blew Their Cover
The health-insurance industry has finally revealed itself for what it is.
Background: The industry hates the idea that's emerged from the Senate Finance Committee of lowering penalties on younger and healthier people who don't buy insurance. Relying on an analysis by PricewaterhouseCoopers, insurers say this means new enrollees will be older and less healthy -- which will drive up costs. And, says the industry, these costs will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher premiums. Proposed taxes on high-priced "Cadillac" policies will also be passed on to consumers. As a result, premiums will rise faster and higher than the government projects.
It's an eleventh-hour bombshell.
But the bomb went off under the insurers. The only reason these costs can be passed on to consumers in the form of higher premiums is because there's not enough competition among private insurers to force them to absorb the costs by becoming more efficient. Get it? Health insurers have just made the best argument yet about why a public insurance option is necessary.
Right now they run their markets and set their prices, and pass on any increased costs directly to consumers. That's what they're threatening to do if the legislation attempts to squeeze, even slightly, the colossal profits they plan to make off of thirty million new paying customers.
They want every penny of those profits. They demand every cent. And if the government dares raise their costs a tad higher than they expected when they first signed on to support the bill, they'll pass those costs on to consumers in the form of higher premiums. They can carry out their threat only because they have unaccountable, untrammeled market power.
But they've now hoisted themselves on their own insured petard. They've exposed themselves. If they had to compete with a public insurance plan, they couldn't get away with this threat. They couldn't pass on the extra costs. They'd have to compete with a public insurance option that forced them to give consumers the best deals possible.
Now's the time for Congress and the White House to say to the insurance industry: You want to play hardball? Okay. We'll play it, too. You didn't want a public insurance option. That was one of your conditions for supporting the bill. You wanted gigantic profits from having thirty million new paying customers and the market to yourself. The Senate Finance Committee and the White House agreed because they wanted your support and were afraid of the negative ads and hurricane of opposition you could finance. But you're even greedier than we imagined. And now you've demonstrated that greed to the American people. They don't want to turn over even more of their hard-earned money to you. So, insurance companies, we've got news for you. We're going to make sure Americans have the freedom to choose a public insurance option that's cheaper and better, and you're going to have to work hard to keep them your customers.
Background: The industry hates the idea that's emerged from the Senate Finance Committee of lowering penalties on younger and healthier people who don't buy insurance. Relying on an analysis by PricewaterhouseCoopers, insurers say this means new enrollees will be older and less healthy -- which will drive up costs. And, says the industry, these costs will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher premiums. Proposed taxes on high-priced "Cadillac" policies will also be passed on to consumers. As a result, premiums will rise faster and higher than the government projects.
It's an eleventh-hour bombshell.
But the bomb went off under the insurers. The only reason these costs can be passed on to consumers in the form of higher premiums is because there's not enough competition among private insurers to force them to absorb the costs by becoming more efficient. Get it? Health insurers have just made the best argument yet about why a public insurance option is necessary.
Right now they run their markets and set their prices, and pass on any increased costs directly to consumers. That's what they're threatening to do if the legislation attempts to squeeze, even slightly, the colossal profits they plan to make off of thirty million new paying customers.
They want every penny of those profits. They demand every cent. And if the government dares raise their costs a tad higher than they expected when they first signed on to support the bill, they'll pass those costs on to consumers in the form of higher premiums. They can carry out their threat only because they have unaccountable, untrammeled market power.
But they've now hoisted themselves on their own insured petard. They've exposed themselves. If they had to compete with a public insurance plan, they couldn't get away with this threat. They couldn't pass on the extra costs. They'd have to compete with a public insurance option that forced them to give consumers the best deals possible.
Now's the time for Congress and the White House to say to the insurance industry: You want to play hardball? Okay. We'll play it, too. You didn't want a public insurance option. That was one of your conditions for supporting the bill. You wanted gigantic profits from having thirty million new paying customers and the market to yourself. The Senate Finance Committee and the White House agreed because they wanted your support and were afraid of the negative ads and hurricane of opposition you could finance. But you're even greedier than we imagined. And now you've demonstrated that greed to the American people. They don't want to turn over even more of their hard-earned money to you. So, insurance companies, we've got news for you. We're going to make sure Americans have the freedom to choose a public insurance option that's cheaper and better, and you're going to have to work hard to keep them your customers.
Saturday, November 27, 2010
Friday, November 26, 2010
Brief announcement
This week's post will come out particularly late (some time late Saturday)--I have an important deadline this Friday. Sorry, folks.
I'll leave you with a couple of great comics from phdcomics.com:
I'll leave you with a couple of great comics from phdcomics.com:
Thursday, November 25, 2010
Nouriel Roubini: "clear by now that a severe U.S. recession is inevitable in next few months."
Nouriel Roubini, a leading economist at New York University, is now saying that a US Recession is almost here:
"It is increasingly clear by now that a severe U.S. recession is inevitable in next few months. Those of us who warned for the last 12 months about a combination of a worsening housing recession, a severe credit crunch and financial meltdown, high oil prices and a saving-less and debt-burdened consumers being on the ropes causing an economy-wide recession were repeatedly rebuffed the consensus view about a soft landing given the presumed resilience of the US consumer."Roubini is a smart economist who often goes against the consensus view."But the evidence is now building that an ugly recession is inevitable."
Wednesday, November 24, 2010
Addendum: The Job Numbers for September
This morning's job numbers are bad enough -- 263,000 more jobs lost in September, and unemployment now at 9.8 percent -- but look behind them and the news is even grimmer. The only reason the numbers don't look worse is that 571,000 workers dropped out of the labor force. Remember, too, that the economy needs about 125,000 new jobs every month just to keep up with a growing population. So we're even further behind.
The numbers would be even worse but for the stimulus package. According to an analysis by the Economic Policy Institute, the stimulus is saving or creating between 200,000 and 250,000 jobs a month. Without it, job losses in September would have been nearly twice what they actually were.
State governments, meanwhile, continue to shed employees. Here's one of the most depressing statistics I've seen (if you need any additional ones): Some 15,600 teachers didn't return to work in September. They were laid off. So our classrooms are bigger, we have fewer teachers, and our students are presumably learning less -- at the very time when they need to be learning more than ever.
The numbers would be even worse but for the stimulus package. According to an analysis by the Economic Policy Institute, the stimulus is saving or creating between 200,000 and 250,000 jobs a month. Without it, job losses in September would have been nearly twice what they actually were.
State governments, meanwhile, continue to shed employees. Here's one of the most depressing statistics I've seen (if you need any additional ones): Some 15,600 teachers didn't return to work in September. They were laid off. So our classrooms are bigger, we have fewer teachers, and our students are presumably learning less -- at the very time when they need to be learning more than ever.
Tuesday, November 23, 2010
Sugar Giants Shove Their Sweetener
by Chris Tenove
Jul/Aug 2003 Issue
What does anybody know about the sugar industry? The people who put the frosting on the frosted flakes keep a low profile and are happy when folks are too busy eating to ask a lot of questions. Now, though, a dust-up with the World Health Organization (WHO) has flushed them into the limelight, where they're pitting profits against public health.
The conflict was inflamed by a new set of dietary guidelines drawn from two years of research by the WHO and the UN Food and Agricultural Organization. The guidelines are part of a worldwide strategy to tame the swelling epidemic of obesity, diabetes, osteoporosis and cardiovascular diseases. One recommendation is that free sugars (i.e. sugar added to foods) should make up no more than 10 percent of our daily caloric intake. The sugar lobby reacted to that suggestion like a toddler asked to hand back his Halloween booty...
'It was particularly stupid for them to put in writing that they're going to try to get Congress to take away WHO's money,' says Michael Jacobsen, executive director of the Center for Science in the Public Interest. 'It gave consumers a chance to see the kind of bullying that is usually done behind closed doors.' [Adbusters]
Monday, November 22, 2010
Changes to the previous post
After reading comments from readers and doing my homework I've made some changes to the previous post, where I describe recent innovations in the Federal Reserve's modus operandi. The text in bold face is either new or has been rewritten from the previous version. I've also added a couple of tables to illustrate what happens to the balance sheet in the case of TSLF and PDCF loans.
This is a summary of the changes:
1. The range of collateral for TSLF loans is the same as that for TAF loans, which is the same as for the discount window. This range is wider, however, than for repurchase agreements.
2. The TSLF is a bonds-for-bonds transaction, and therefore doesn't change the monetary base. The Federal Reserve takes possession of the borrower's securities for 28 days, and lends government securities. The PDCF is a cash-for-bonds transaction, which does change the monetary base. The Fed will offset PDCF loans by conducting direct purchases of government securities, reverse repos, or by letting its Treasurys expire.
Thanks to everyone who left a comment or sent me an e-mail.
This is a summary of the changes:
1. The range of collateral for TSLF loans is the same as that for TAF loans, which is the same as for the discount window. This range is wider, however, than for repurchase agreements.
2. The TSLF is a bonds-for-bonds transaction, and therefore doesn't change the monetary base. The Federal Reserve takes possession of the borrower's securities for 28 days, and lends government securities. The PDCF is a cash-for-bonds transaction, which does change the monetary base. The Fed will offset PDCF loans by conducting direct purchases of government securities, reverse repos, or by letting its Treasurys expire.
Thanks to everyone who left a comment or sent me an e-mail.
Sunday, November 21, 2010
Risk Factors For A 2008 Recession
Here are the top risk factors for 2008 US Recession:
- Continuing Housing Bust
- High Oil Prices
- Security Issues
- Credit Crunch
- High Consumer Debt
- Large Trade Deficit
- Consumer Spending is slowing (it makes up 70% of the US GDP)
- Commercial Construction decline
Saturday, November 20, 2010
Empty Hands on the Climate, and What Obama Needs to Do
On Friday, Denmark's climate and energy minister, Connie Hedegaard, who will be chairing U.N.-sponsored climate talks in December in Copenhagen, said President Obama needs to do more on climate. "It is hard to imagine that he will be receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo on Dec. 10 and then come empty-handed to Copenhagen a week later," she said.
But there's no way between now and then Obama can get a strong climate bill through Congress.
Over the next months, the White House needs to focus on health care if it's to have any hope of coming up with anything more than Big Pharma and the private insurance companies want.
This is the cost of trying to do so much so quickly. Initiatives revert to powerful industry lobbyists because there's no time to organize countervailing power. When he's trying to do everything at once, the President can't mobilize public opinion behind any one thing. Progressive voices (which have difficulty being heard even under the best of circumstances) drown each other out because they're hollering over one another.
Climate change legislation is moving forward -- but big polluters have shaped much of it. As I noted recently, the Waxman-Markey climate bill, passed by the House last June, gives away 85 percent of pollution permits to the nation's biggest polluters, and the "cap" it proposes on overall carbon emissions would cut greenhouse gas emissions only by an estimated 2 to 4 percent by 2020 compared to the UN reference year of 1990. The Kerry-Boxer bill has a stronger cap on emissions but it's still far short of what's necessary -- and it leaves out the hardest part, which is the actual cap-and-trade mechanism.
Why has so little been accomplished? Because coal, shale, oil, big manufacturers, and utilities -- the big old polluters (BOPs) -- have beaten back anything better.
The only real countervailing powers on climate change are industries that stand to gain from stronger legislation -- mostly nuclear and ethanol, along with a smattering of companies that have invested in wind, biomass, and solar. But they're no match for the BOPs. Nor do their bottom lines necessarily match what's good for the world.
Yes, the Environmental Protection Agency is moving forward on its own efforts to reduce greenhouse gases, and the White House is quietly using the threat of the EPA doing more as a prod to get the BOPs on board with legislation that the White House says will be easier on them than what the EPA comes up with. But that's no real threat. The BOPs know they can keep the EPA tied up in litigation for years.
So here's my suggestion. The White House should tell Congress it's raising the bar on climate change but is simultaneously putting the current legislation on hold -- until it can focus the public's attention on it. That is, until after a worthy piece of healthcare legislation is on the President's desk.
Arriving in Copenhagen strongly committed to fight for a large reduction in greenhouse gases, even if that means empty hands at the time, is better than arriving there with a weak and ineffective law.
Friday, November 19, 2010
Thursday, November 18, 2010
How the Fed took the money out of monetary policy
UPDATE: I wrote an expanded, better version of this post, in two parts: Part I and Part II.
The Federal Reserve used to have only a few tools to do its job —that is, until it got the genie out of the bottle. Sometimes quietly, other times conspicuously, the Fed is surely changing the way it creates liquidity.
(Jim Hamilton has been narrating these changes since the summer. Part of this post is my one-stop account. Jim’s posts, which are much better, are here: September 23, December 14, December 16, March 15.)
The central bank has a balance sheet, just like any other bank. As assets, it holds government securities, loans to depository institutions (banks), and other assets. As liabilities, it has currency (the cash in your pockets) and reserve balances. Reserves are deposits that banks keep at the central bank. When a bank needs currency it withdraws from its deposit, effectively turning it into bills and coins that you and I can use.
Until now, macroeconomics textbooks have been telling us that central banks use three tools to control the amount of currency in circulation. Looking at them from an accounting perspective will help us understand what the Federal Reserve has been up to recently:
1) Open market operation. This is an outright purchase of government securities from banks. When conducting this operation, the central bank increases its assets and credits banks’ reserve balances. Eventually, banks withdraw from their reserves at the central bank and turn them into cash. So an open market operation amounts to withdrawing government securities from the economy and replacing them with cash. The central bank can also reduce the amount of cash in circulation, by doing just the opposite: selling government securities and absorbing cash. By far, an open market operation is the best-know of the central bank’s tools.
This is a simplified version of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s balance sheet on August 15, 2007:
Source: Federal Reserve, H.4.1 release.
(For the moment, regard “repurchase agreements” as government securities.)
Suppose that on August 16, 2007, the Fed pumped $1,000 million in the system through an open market operation. The Fed’s balance sheet would experience the following changes, once banks have withdrawn the new funds from their reserve accounts:
2) Direct loan. This tool is usually referred to as the “discount window.” The central bank simply lends money to a bank. The borrower must pledge collateral with a value that exceeds that of the direct loan. The central bank increases its balance of loans, and simultaneously credits the reserves of the borrowing bank. Then the bank withdraws from its reserves, effectively turning them into currency in circulation. Asking for a direct loan usually means that the bank was not able to obtain liquidity in the inter-bank market. Moreover, borrowers are also subject to scrutiny by the central bank, and watched by other banks. And the interest rate charged for direct loans is higher than the inter-bank rate. For those reasons, the discount window is used rarely and in small amounts.
3) Reserve requirements. Banks are required to keep a certain amount of reserves at the central bank. If the central bank increases that requirement, banks are forced to withdraw currency from the economy and put it in their reserve account. The central bank can also do the opposite, i.e. increase the amount of currency in circulation by lowering the reserve requirement. This tool is the least often used.
Normally banks obtain liquidity for their daily operations in the inter-bank market, where they borrow from and lend to each other at the going interest rate. Last summer some U.S. banks started experiencing losses from their portfolios of mortgages and securitized mortgages. Nobody knew which banks would suffer losses in the future, or how large they could be. So banks starting growing wary of lending to each other, and it became more expensive—or just plain impossible—to raise as much liquidity as needed.
The Fed stepped in to help. Instead of providing liquidity through outright open market operations, it increased the use of an operation that is more frequently used, yet less well known: repurchase agreements. These are short-term loans, usually overnight, extended by the Fed to banks. As collateral, banks transfer high-quality securities to the central bank for the duration of the loan. At expiration, the loan is repaid and the bank takes back its securities.
From an accounting perspective, the repo increases the central bank’s assets and potential currency in circulation, much like an open market operation does. This, for example, is what happened between August 8 and August 15.
Soon after, the Fed decided that it didn’t want to increase the potential amount of liquidity in the system, which affects short-term interest rates and inflation. So it offset the repurchase agreements by selling some of its own government securities (or letting them expire without purchasing more), and thus withdrawing cash from the system. So the repos didn’t have any bottom-line effect on liquidity: they merely changed the composition of the Fed’s assets and provided temporary cash to the borrowing banks. This is why Jim Hamilton writes that the Fed has been doing monetary policy using the asset side of the balance sheet. Another way to see it is that the Fed has been conducting money-less monetary policy, because its actions barely affect the monetary base (reserves plus currency in circulation).
Here’s how a repurchase agreement would change the Fed’s balance sheet, after offsetting it with an open market operation:
After doing this for months, and aware that banks were not getting as much liquidity as they wanted, in December the Fed unveiled the Term Auction Facility (TAF). As its name suggests, this is an auction for a limited amount of Fed’s loans. Just like a repo, loans through the new facility require borrowers to use assets as collateral to the Fed for the duration of the loan. But the TAF represents an improvement with respect to repos in their capacity to provide liquidity. First, it lowers the bar for the type of assets that the Fed accepts, which are the same as those for the discount window. Second, it is more targeted than repos: the bidding system ensures that the limited loans go to the banks that value them most.
By themselves, TAF loans would increase both assets and liabilities of the Fed, just like open market operations and repos. But, once again, the Fed partially offset those loans by selling securities and withdrawing cash from the system. Here’s the simplified balance sheet on December 26 and August 15:
Source: Federal Reserve, H.4.1 release.
The balance of TAF loans grew from $20bn to $60bn between December 26 and March 12.
Still, all these liquidity venues are available only to members of the Federal Reserve system, which I have been calling “banks” and whose proper name is “depository institutions.” There is another set of financial intermediaries and investors, such as Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers. They have been as affected by the liquidity crisis as much as banks have, but don’t have direct access to neither the discount window nor TAF.
So the Fed has announced two new facilities for those institutions. The first one is the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), to open on March 27. At this new window, all primary dealers -all banks and brokers that trade in government securities with the Fed- are allowed to borrow up to $200bn of government securities for 28 days. The minimum quality of the assets seems to be the same as those for than for the TAF (they include federal agency debt, federal agency residential-mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and non-agency AAA/Aaa-rated private-label residential MBS). But in contrast with TAF this new facility lends government securities, not cash. Through the TSLF the Federal Reserve will be temporarily swapping safe government securities for risky assets. This is how these loans would look like on the balance sheet:
The second institution is the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), which started operating on March 17. This venue provides overnight cash loans to all primary dealers, at the discount window interest rate, and acceptseven riskier the same type of collateral. they accept all collateral eligible for repos, plus investment-grade corporate securities, municipal securities, MBS and asset-backed securities. With the PDCF, all primary dealers have de facto access to the discount window, from which only depository institutions could borrow before. The loan will increase the monetary base (read the PDCF FAQ). To offset the increase, the Fed will utilize "a number of tools, including, but not necessarily limited to, outright sales of Treasury securities, reverse repurchase agreements, redemptions of Treasury securities, and changes in the sizes of conventional RP transactions." Here's what a PDCF loan looks like, after it has been offset:
In fact, the Federal Reserve has included PDCF as a sub-entry within "Other loans" in the balance sheet, next to the discount window loans, because PDCF and discount window are in fact one and the same facility.
Unlike the TAF, neither TSLF nor PDCF will increase the assets of the Fed. It will temporarily decrease balances of government securities, and increase those of sketchy securities. And because participant institutions don’t have Fed reserves, TSLF loans don’t affect the monetary base. These two venues circumvent the necessity to conduct open market operations so that the monetary base doesn’t change.
Here’s the balance Fed again, in December and after the PDCF opened:
Source: Federal Reserve, H.4.1 release.
With its new tools, the Fed has provided liquidity without printing much money. It has temporarily absorbed risky and illiquid securities, and supplied government securities, which are risk-free. So instead of monetary policy, in the sense we traditionally have thought about it, the Fed has become a risk-absorber (temporarily, we hope). Or, to put it less kindly, a pawnbroker.
Will these new tools make it to the textbooks? It’s hard to tell whether the particular facilities (TAF, TSLF, etc.) will survive. I think that some unified, generalized form of credit to non-depository institutions will stay. But I’ll have to write about that another time.
Addendum:
Somebody asked me how the Fed conducts an "offsetting" open market operation when the Fed extends a TAF loan. This table summarizes it:
The Fed extends the loan, which is an asset for the lender, and credits the bank's reserve account. (In the table I assume that the borrower withdraws the funds from the reserve account, so they're turned into currency in circulation.) The collateral doesn't show up in the balance sheet, because the Fed does not take ownership of it. At the same time, the Fed sells $1,000M worth of government securities, absorbing that same amount of cash from the banking system.
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The Federal Reserve used to have only a few tools to do its job —that is, until it got the genie out of the bottle. Sometimes quietly, other times conspicuously, the Fed is surely changing the way it creates liquidity.
(Jim Hamilton has been narrating these changes since the summer. Part of this post is my one-stop account. Jim’s posts, which are much better, are here: September 23, December 14, December 16, March 15.)
The central bank has a balance sheet, just like any other bank. As assets, it holds government securities, loans to depository institutions (banks), and other assets. As liabilities, it has currency (the cash in your pockets) and reserve balances. Reserves are deposits that banks keep at the central bank. When a bank needs currency it withdraws from its deposit, effectively turning it into bills and coins that you and I can use.
Until now, macroeconomics textbooks have been telling us that central banks use three tools to control the amount of currency in circulation. Looking at them from an accounting perspective will help us understand what the Federal Reserve has been up to recently:
1) Open market operation. This is an outright purchase of government securities from banks. When conducting this operation, the central bank increases its assets and credits banks’ reserve balances. Eventually, banks withdraw from their reserves at the central bank and turn them into cash. So an open market operation amounts to withdrawing government securities from the economy and replacing them with cash. The central bank can also reduce the amount of cash in circulation, by doing just the opposite: selling government securities and absorbing cash. By far, an open market operation is the best-know of the central bank’s tools.
This is a simplified version of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s balance sheet on August 15, 2007:
| Federal Reserve's balance sheet, $ millions (Aug. 15, 2007) | ||
| Assets | US government securities | 789,601 |
| Repurchase agreements | 24,000 | |
| Reverse repurchase agreements | -31,941 | |
| Direct loans | 264 | |
| Other assets | 37,058 | |
| Liabilities | Currency in circulation | 813,085 |
| Reserve balances | 5,897 | |
(For the moment, regard “repurchase agreements” as government securities.)
Suppose that on August 16, 2007, the Fed pumped $1,000 million in the system through an open market operation. The Fed’s balance sheet would experience the following changes, once banks have withdrawn the new funds from their reserve accounts:
| Changes in the Fed's balance sheet after a $1,000M open market operation | ||
| Assets | US government securities | +1,000 |
| Repurchase agreements | 0 | |
| Reverse repurchase agreements | 0 | |
| Direct loans | 0 | |
| Other assets | 0 | |
| Liabilities | Currency in circulation | +1,000 |
| Reserve balances | 0 | |
2) Direct loan. This tool is usually referred to as the “discount window.” The central bank simply lends money to a bank. The borrower must pledge collateral with a value that exceeds that of the direct loan. The central bank increases its balance of loans, and simultaneously credits the reserves of the borrowing bank. Then the bank withdraws from its reserves, effectively turning them into currency in circulation. Asking for a direct loan usually means that the bank was not able to obtain liquidity in the inter-bank market. Moreover, borrowers are also subject to scrutiny by the central bank, and watched by other banks. And the interest rate charged for direct loans is higher than the inter-bank rate. For those reasons, the discount window is used rarely and in small amounts.
3) Reserve requirements. Banks are required to keep a certain amount of reserves at the central bank. If the central bank increases that requirement, banks are forced to withdraw currency from the economy and put it in their reserve account. The central bank can also do the opposite, i.e. increase the amount of currency in circulation by lowering the reserve requirement. This tool is the least often used.
Normally banks obtain liquidity for their daily operations in the inter-bank market, where they borrow from and lend to each other at the going interest rate. Last summer some U.S. banks started experiencing losses from their portfolios of mortgages and securitized mortgages. Nobody knew which banks would suffer losses in the future, or how large they could be. So banks starting growing wary of lending to each other, and it became more expensive—or just plain impossible—to raise as much liquidity as needed.
The Fed stepped in to help. Instead of providing liquidity through outright open market operations, it increased the use of an operation that is more frequently used, yet less well known: repurchase agreements. These are short-term loans, usually overnight, extended by the Fed to banks. As collateral, banks transfer high-quality securities to the central bank for the duration of the loan. At expiration, the loan is repaid and the bank takes back its securities.
From an accounting perspective, the repo increases the central bank’s assets and potential currency in circulation, much like an open market operation does. This, for example, is what happened between August 8 and August 15.
Soon after, the Fed decided that it didn’t want to increase the potential amount of liquidity in the system, which affects short-term interest rates and inflation. So it offset the repurchase agreements by selling some of its own government securities (or letting them expire without purchasing more), and thus withdrawing cash from the system. So the repos didn’t have any bottom-line effect on liquidity: they merely changed the composition of the Fed’s assets and provided temporary cash to the borrowing banks. This is why Jim Hamilton writes that the Fed has been doing monetary policy using the asset side of the balance sheet. Another way to see it is that the Fed has been conducting money-less monetary policy, because its actions barely affect the monetary base (reserves plus currency in circulation).
Here’s how a repurchase agreement would change the Fed’s balance sheet, after offsetting it with an open market operation:
| Changes in the Fed's balance sheet after a $1,000M repurchase agreement, offset by an open market operation | ||
| Assets | US government securities | -1,000 |
| Repurchase agreements | +1,000 | |
| Reverse repurchase agreements | 0 | |
| Direct loans | 0 | |
| Other assets | 0 | |
| Liabilities | Currency in circulation | 0 (-1,000 + 1,000) |
| Reserve balances | 0 | |
After doing this for months, and aware that banks were not getting as much liquidity as they wanted, in December the Fed unveiled the Term Auction Facility (TAF). As its name suggests, this is an auction for a limited amount of Fed’s loans. Just like a repo, loans through the new facility require borrowers to use assets as collateral to the Fed for the duration of the loan. But the TAF represents an improvement with respect to repos in their capacity to provide liquidity. First, it lowers the bar for the type of assets that the Fed accepts, which are the same as those for the discount window. Second, it is more targeted than repos: the bidding system ensures that the limited loans go to the banks that value them most.
By themselves, TAF loans would increase both assets and liabilities of the Fed, just like open market operations and repos. But, once again, the Fed partially offset those loans by selling securities and withdrawing cash from the system. Here’s the simplified balance sheet on December 26 and August 15:
| Federal Reserve's balance sheet, $ millions | |||
| Assets | Aug. 15, 2007 | Dec. 26, 2007 | |
| US government securities | 789,601 | 754,612 | |
| Repurchase agreements | 24,000 | 42,500 | |
| Reverse repurchase agreements | -31,941 | -40,542 | |
| Term Auction Facility loans | 0 | 20,000 | |
| Direct loans | 264 | 4,535 | |
| Other assets | 37,058 | 52,869 | |
| Liabilities | Currency in circulation | 813,085 | 829,193 |
| Reserve balances | 5,897 | 4,781 | |
The balance of TAF loans grew from $20bn to $60bn between December 26 and March 12.
Still, all these liquidity venues are available only to members of the Federal Reserve system, which I have been calling “banks” and whose proper name is “depository institutions.” There is another set of financial intermediaries and investors, such as Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers. They have been as affected by the liquidity crisis as much as banks have, but don’t have direct access to neither the discount window nor TAF.
So the Fed has announced two new facilities for those institutions. The first one is the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), to open on March 27. At this new window, all primary dealers -all banks and brokers that trade in government securities with the Fed- are allowed to borrow up to $200bn of government securities for 28 days. The minimum quality of the assets seems to be the same as those for than for the TAF (they include federal agency debt, federal agency residential-mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and non-agency AAA/Aaa-rated private-label residential MBS). But in contrast with TAF this new facility lends government securities, not cash. Through the TSLF the Federal Reserve will be temporarily swapping safe government securities for risky assets. This is how these loans would look like on the balance sheet:
| Changes in the Fed's balance sheet after a $1,000M TSLF loan | ||
| Assets | US government securities | -1,000 |
| Repurchase agreements | 0 | |
| Reverse repurchase agreements | 0 | |
| Direct loans | 0 | |
| TSLF loan | +1,000 | |
| Other assets | 0 | |
| Liabilities | Currency in circulation | 0 |
| Reserve balances | 0 | |
The second institution is the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), which started operating on March 17. This venue provides overnight cash loans to all primary dealers, at the discount window interest rate, and accepts
| Changes in the Fed's balance sheet after a $1,000M PDCF loan, offset by an open market operation | ||
| Assets | US government securities | -1,000 |
| Repurchase agreements | 0 | |
| Reverse repurchase agreements | 0 | |
| Direct loans | 0 | |
| PDCF loan | +1,000 | |
| TSLF loan | 0 | |
| Other assets | 0 | |
| Liabilities | Currency in circulation | -1,000 + 1,000 |
| Reserve balances | 0 | |
In fact, the Federal Reserve has included PDCF as a sub-entry within "Other loans" in the balance sheet, next to the discount window loans, because PDCF and discount window are in fact one and the same facility.
Here’s the balance Fed again, in December and after the PDCF opened:
| Federal Reserve's balance sheet, $ millions | |||
| Assets | Dec. 26, 2007 | Mar. 19, 2008 | |
| US government securities | 754,612 | 660,484 | |
| Repurchase agreements | 42,500 | 62,000 | |
| Reverse repurchase agreements | -40,542 | -46,143 | |
| Term Auction Facility loans | 20,000 | 80,000 | |
| Primary Dealers Credit Facility | 0 | 28,800 | |
| Direct loans | 4,535 | 125 | |
| Other assets | 52,869 | 36,603 | |
| Liabilities | Currency in circulation | 829,193 | 818,362 |
| Reserve balances | 4,781 | 3,507 | |
With its new tools, the Fed has provided liquidity without printing much money. It has temporarily absorbed risky and illiquid securities, and supplied government securities, which are risk-free. So instead of monetary policy, in the sense we traditionally have thought about it, the Fed has become a risk-absorber (temporarily, we hope). Or, to put it less kindly, a pawnbroker.
Will these new tools make it to the textbooks? It’s hard to tell whether the particular facilities (TAF, TSLF, etc.) will survive. I think that some unified, generalized form of credit to non-depository institutions will stay. But I’ll have to write about that another time.
Addendum:
Somebody asked me how the Fed conducts an "offsetting" open market operation when the Fed extends a TAF loan. This table summarizes it:
| Changes in the Fed's balance sheet after a $1,000M TAF loan with an offsetting open market operation | ||
| Assets | US government securities | -1,000 |
| Repurchase agreements | 0 | |
| Reverse repurchase agreements | 0 | |
| Teerm Auction Facility loans | +1,000 | |
| Direct loans | 0 | |
| Other assets | 0 | |
| Liabilities | Currency in circulation | (-1,000 + 1,000) |
| Reserve balances | 0 | |
The Fed extends the loan, which is an asset for the lender, and credits the bank's reserve account. (In the table I assume that the borrower withdraws the funds from the reserve account, so they're turned into currency in circulation.) The collateral doesn't show up in the balance sheet, because the Fed does not take ownership of it. At the same time, the Fed sells $1,000M worth of government securities, absorbing that same amount of cash from the banking system.
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