Thursday, January 29, 2009

There Was a Reason They Called It... The Casino Economy

by Thomas Croft


02 Jul 03


In the last three years, a 'perfect storm' of rising energy costs, record consumer and corporate debt and massive trade and current account deficits joined with unsustainable investment practices, and resulted in an economic collapse. The first recession since 1929 to be primarily caused by over-investment, these 'collateral damage' investing schemes-in overseas boondoggles and sweatshops, extreme mergers, absurd dot-coms and derivative scams-all came home to roost. Enron used all of these investment tricks and more. The corruption scandals of 2001-2 completed the melt-down. Now, the world is probably in a double-dip recession, thanks partly to the scandal and continuing international disruptions.


The problem with casino bets and Russian Roulette is that somebody always loses. [CounterPunch]

Wednesday, January 28, 2009

Recession buzz

Chart 1 (click to enlarge)

It’s been hard for news readers to avoid the word “recession” this January. The number of newspaper stories mentioning it has certainly been overwhelming (see Chart 1). Weak economic data might seem to justify the gloom. Growth has slowed down and the labor market has weakened. Still, we haven’t seen a single quarter of negative growth, and the employment figures have been equivocal, and certainly not recessionary. So, given what we know about the state of the economy, is all this recession chatter justified, or are journalists getting carried away?

To answer that question, I have put together data on the tone of economic reporting in the newspapers, as well as on indicators of the health of the real economy. Then I have estimated a statistical model and compared the level of pessimism of the newspapers with the actual mood that one would expect based on the known state of the economy. The results are pretty exciting. So exciting, in fact, that I plan on updating and reporting my calculations every month, here on EconWeekly.

My measure of usage of the word “recession” is The Economist’s R-word index: the number of stories containing that word in the New York Times and the Washington Post. The index is a surprisingly good indicator of economic slowdowns. It never fails to rise sharply at the beginning of recessions. (See Chart 2.) And in spite of its simplicity, it captures the sentiment of the newspapers pretty well. Mark Doms and Norman Morin, of the Federal Reserve Board, constructed a much fancier recession index for a research project on the subject, containing dozens of media sources and carefully filtering the search terms. And yet, the difference between their measure and The Economist’s R-word index is almost always small. (See Figure 4.1 in Doms and Morin’s paper.)

Chart 2 (click to enlarge)

To gauge the present and immediate future of the economy, I include the following variables in my statistical model: the unemployment rate, the growth of the S&P500 index, the growth of the price of oil, the growth of personal consumption expenditures, and the spread between the ten-year bond and the one-year Treasury bill. (Econometrics jocks can find the details of the statistical model below.)

My model shows that newspapers have indeed been too gloomy this past month. In January, known economic conditions would have justified about 200 stories mentioning the word “recession”; the actual count was around 300. Up until December, however, newspaper mood was approximately in line with the actual state of the economy. (See Chart 3.) Why did newspaper sentiment diverge from economic fundamentals last month?

Chart 3 (click to enlarge)

In January we witnessed a sequence of unusual events. There was ongoing talk about the fiscal stimulus package, which is being introduced precisely to avoid an economic slowdown. The President sketched a plan on January 18, then the House of Representatives announced theirs a week later, and then the Senate considered changing it. Then there was a mini crash in the stock market, followed by the surprise cut of the Federal Reserve’s target interest rate on January 22, and then another cut at the Fed’s scheduled meeting on the 30th. Every newspaper story that reported any of these events most likely included the word “recession.”

But, at least in part, I believe that the buzz has to do with incentives in the news industry. Even when reporting facts, every media outlet strives to agree with the views of its audience. Fox News would lose its parish if it started “showing” that the Iraq surge was wrong and ineffective, and the Wall Street Journal would clash against the opinions of its readers if it started “proving” that the Bush tax cuts were a bad idea. Maintaining an audience depends vitally on conforming to their prior expectations. (Note to self: what do EconWeekly readers expect?)

Economics reporting is a bit different because the state of the economy can be measured and verified more objectively. As a result, views are more homogeneous across audiences. Still, media outlets need to take into account three factors which determine the views news consumers, and therefore the choice of tone and volume of economic reports: intrinsic pessimism, past reports on the state of the economy, and reports from other media outlets.

Bryan Caplan of George Mason University has identified pessimism as one of the four capital biases of the average Joe. (Read this summary.) People routinely see negative trends in long-term living standards, wages, inequality, etc. The gloom extends to the state of the economy at any given moment. About half of Americans have been thinking that we are in a recession, or on the brink of one, since October! Where that pessimism comes from, I have no idea. David Hume, Caplan says, thought that “the humour of blaming the present, and admiring the past, is strongly rooted in human nature.” It sounds appealing. But whichever the reason, the media recognize the appeal of worrying reports about the economy —and deliver.

Inherent pessimism influences the interpretation that the media put on any given piece of hard data. But once the newspapers set clouds in the horizon, their incentives to deliver negative news become stronger, because they need to conform to the readers’ expectations. A newspaper that changed its view on the state of the economy would go against the prior views —plus, it would be accused of the horrible crime of flip-flopping. A newspaper has therefore an incentive to keep a certain mood even on something as relatively objective as the state of the economy. Past negative reports will lead to more negative reports in the future, feeding a cycle of pessimism, unless new hard data against such views are so strong that the paper is forced to tone it down over time.

Finally, people are exposed to reports from more than one source of information, even if it’s secondhand. Any newspaper that strayed from the average mood of all other newspapers would conflict with the established view, alienating itself. Any given outlet has thus an incentive to stay in line with the tone of all the major media, resulting in “herd behavior”: the tendency to base decisions (in this case the tone of the news) on the behavior of the rest of the community (other media outlets).

The combination of natural pessimism and the need to conform to the public’s views, therefore, explains why sometimes reporting on the economy is not consistent with actual events, as is the case now. Only policymakers, animal spirits and time can determine whether we’ll see a recession in 2008. For now, skip the editorials on economics.

Statistical model:
VAR, with monthly data, from January of 1976 through the latest month available. Each equation includes six lags. The variables are: the R-word index, the unemployment rate, the change in nonfarm payrolls, the slope of the yield curve (10-year minus 1-year), the growth of personal consumption expenditures on durable goods accumulated over the current and previous two months, and the growth of the industrial production index, also accumulated over the same period. I also include a set of monthly dummies and a dummy variable that equals 1 if the NBER announced a decline in real GDP. The unemployment rate is the first release reported by the BLS. The change in payrolls mimics the one reported by the BLS, that is, it is equal to the first estimate of payrolls for month t, minus the revised (first update) figure for month t-1. Both unemployment and payroll figures come from ALFRED. The yields on the ten-year bond and the one-year Treasury bill are monthly averages, from FRED. Durable expenditures come from the NIPA accounts, via FRED, and the industrial production index is from the Federal Reserve, also via FRED.


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Tuesday, January 27, 2009

Recession buzz

Chart 1 (click to enlarge)

It’s been hard for news readers to avoid the word “recession” this January. The number of newspaper stories mentioning it has certainly been overwhelming (see Chart 1). Weak economic data might seem to justify the gloom. Growth has slowed down and the labor market has weakened. Still, we haven’t seen a single quarter of negative growth, and the employment figures have been equivocal, and certainly not recessionary. So, given what we know about the state of the economy, is all this recession chatter justified, or are journalists getting carried away?

To answer that question, I have put together data on the tone of economic reporting in the newspapers, as well as on indicators of the health of the real economy. Then I have estimated a statistical model and compared the level of pessimism of the newspapers with the actual mood that one would expect based on the known state of the economy. The results are pretty exciting. So exciting, in fact, that I plan on updating and reporting my calculations every month, here on EconWeekly.

My measure of usage of the word “recession” is The Economist’s R-word index: the number of stories containing that word in the New York Times and the Washington Post. The index is a surprisingly good indicator of economic slowdowns. It never fails to rise sharply at the beginning of recessions. (See Chart 2.) And in spite of its simplicity, it captures the sentiment of the newspapers pretty well. Mark Doms and Norman Morin, of the Federal Reserve Board, constructed a much fancier recession index for a research project on the subject, containing dozens of media sources and carefully filtering the search terms. And yet, the difference between their measure and The Economist’s R-word index is almost always small. (See Figure 4.1 in Doms and Morin’s paper.)

Chart 2 (click to enlarge)

To gauge the present and immediate future of the economy, I include the following variables in my statistical model: the unemployment rate, the growth of the S&P500 index, the growth of the price of oil, the growth of personal consumption expenditures, and the spread between the ten-year bond and the one-year Treasury bill. (Econometrics jocks can find the details of the statistical model below.)

My model shows that newspapers have indeed been too gloomy this past month. In January, known economic conditions would have justified about 200 stories mentioning the word “recession”; the actual count was around 300. Up until December, however, newspaper mood was approximately in line with the actual state of the economy. (See Chart 3.) Why did newspaper sentiment diverge from economic fundamentals last month?

Chart 3 (click to enlarge)

In January we witnessed a sequence of unusual events. There was ongoing talk about the fiscal stimulus package, which is being introduced precisely to avoid an economic slowdown. The President sketched a plan on January 18, then the House of Representatives announced theirs a week later, and then the Senate considered changing it. Then there was a mini crash in the stock market, followed by the surprise cut of the Federal Reserve’s target interest rate on January 22, and then another cut at the Fed’s scheduled meeting on the 30th. Every newspaper story that reported any of these events most likely included the word “recession.”

But, at least in part, I believe that the buzz has to do with incentives in the news industry. Even when reporting facts, every media outlet strives to agree with the views of its audience. Fox News would lose its parish if it started “showing” that the Iraq surge was wrong and ineffective, and the Wall Street Journal would clash against the opinions of its readers if it started “proving” that the Bush tax cuts were a bad idea. Maintaining an audience depends vitally on conforming to their prior expectations. (Note to self: what do EconWeekly readers expect?)

Economics reporting is a bit different because the state of the economy can be measured and verified more objectively. As a result, views are more homogeneous across audiences. Still, media outlets need to take into account three factors which determine the views news consumers, and therefore the choice of tone and volume of economic reports: intrinsic pessimism, past reports on the state of the economy, and reports from other media outlets.

Bryan Caplan of George Mason University has identified pessimism as one of the four capital biases of the average Joe. (Read this summary.) People routinely see negative trends in long-term living standards, wages, inequality, etc. The gloom extends to the state of the economy at any given moment. About half of Americans have been thinking that we are in a recession, or on the brink of one, since October! Where that pessimism comes from, I have no idea. David Hume, Caplan says, thought that “the humour of blaming the present, and admiring the past, is strongly rooted in human nature.” It sounds appealing. But whichever the reason, the media recognize the appeal of worrying reports about the economy —and deliver.

Inherent pessimism influences the interpretation that the media put on any given piece of hard data. But once the newspapers set clouds in the horizon, their incentives to deliver negative news become stronger, because they need to conform to the readers’ expectations. A newspaper that changed its view on the state of the economy would go against the prior views —plus, it would be accused of the horrible crime of flip-flopping. A newspaper has therefore an incentive to keep a certain mood even on something as relatively objective as the state of the economy. Past negative reports will lead to more negative reports in the future, feeding a cycle of pessimism, unless new hard data against such views are so strong that the paper is forced to tone it down over time.

Finally, people are exposed to reports from more than one source of information, even if it’s secondhand. Any newspaper that strayed from the average mood of all other newspapers would conflict with the established view, alienating itself. Any given outlet has thus an incentive to stay in line with the tone of all the major media, resulting in “herd behavior”: the tendency to base decisions (in this case the tone of the news) on the behavior of the rest of the community (other media outlets).

The combination of natural pessimism and the need to conform to the public’s views, therefore, explains why sometimes reporting on the economy is not consistent with actual events, as is the case now. Only policymakers, animal spirits and time can determine whether we’ll see a recession in 2008. For now, skip the editorials on economics.

Statistical model:
VAR, with monthly data, from January of 1976 through the latest month available. Each equation includes six lags. The variables are: the R-word index, the unemployment rate, the change in nonfarm payrolls, the slope of the yield curve (10-year minus 1-year), the growth of personal consumption expenditures on durable goods accumulated over the current and previous two months, and the growth of the industrial production index, also accumulated over the same period. I also include a set of monthly dummies and a dummy variable that equals 1 if the NBER announced a decline in real GDP. The unemployment rate is the first release reported by the BLS. The change in payrolls mimics the one reported by the BLS, that is, it is equal to the first estimate of payrolls for month t, minus the revised (first update) figure for month t-1. Both unemployment and payroll figures come from ALFRED. The yields on the ten-year bond and the one-year Treasury bill are monthly averages, from FRED. Durable expenditures come from the NIPA accounts, via FRED, and the industrial production index is from the Federal Reserve, also via FRED.


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Sunday, January 25, 2009

A Hybrid Vehicle (One Third Bailout, Two-Thirds Chapter 11) for Automakers, But No More TARP for Wall Street

The Big Three need a hybrid vehicle, if you will -- a combination of chapter 11 bankruptcy and a bailout. For every taxpayer dollar they receive, the automakers should be required to come up with $2 from their stakeholders (creditors, shareholders, executives, white and blue collar employees), just as stakeholders would have to sacrifice under Chapter 11.

This is the only way GM, Ford, and Chrysler can possibly accumulate enough money to survive and restructure. It's also the way to avoid favoring the Big Three over foreign automakers in the US (if they want to make the same $2 for every $1 sacrifice, they can do so, too.) And it's a way to avoiding the "moral hazard" of every other big company that gets into trouble during this downturn expecting Washington to bail it out as well.

The only reason for taxpayers to put up even one dollar for every two that the automakers put up is the significant social cost that would occur if any one of the Big Three were to rapidly shrink -- including unemployment insurance, increased liabilities for the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, lost tax revenues, and costs associated with large numbers of people suffering losses of wages and employment.

Wall Street is a different story entirely. There's no good reason for taxpayers to continue bailing out the Street. TARP hasn't worked. Some $350 billion later, credit markets are still quite frozen. The only obvious beneficiaries of TARP have been the executives, creditors, and shareholders of the big Wall Street banks, who have come out better than they would have had there been no Wall Street bailout.

From here on, Wall Street banks that can't pay their creditors should have to resourt to Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code, which allows a firm to pay off its creditors -- say, 30 cents on the dollar -- and then wipe the slate clean.

Chapter 11 is ideally suited to the Wall Street credit crisis because it creates a forum in which creditors are forced to negotiate and ultimately accept a "market" price for the securities they hold -- thereby accomplishing what the Treasury first tried to do under TARP: create market valuations for these otherwise unmarketable securities. And by allowing the big banks to clean up their balance sheets and get rid of their "toxic" securities, Chapter 11 clears the way for the banks to attract new investors now scared off by the unknown dimensions of potential losses.

There's no reason to suppose Chapter 11 would be especially difficult for a big bank, nor are there likely to be significant social costs. Two months ago the Treasury warned of "contagion" if Wall Street weren't bailed out. But the real contagion involves the continued fears and uncertainties surrounding mortgage-backed securities -- and Chapter 11 provides a way to reduce these.

Prior to 1978, a company could seek Chapter 11 protection only if it was insolvent or was unable to pay maturing debt, and Chapter 11 normally meant that a company's managers would have to relinquish control. But in 1978 Congress amended Chapter 11 to delete the insolvency test, and also to allow managers to keep control of a company unless a bankruptcy judge explicitly finds them to be incompetent or untrustworthy. Since then, instead of presiding over meetings of creditors where claims are bargained out, judges have left most decisions -- even major ones -- to existing managers.

Naysayers point to Lehman Brothers as evidence that Chapter 11 won't work. But it wasn't tried, mainly because the Treasury was by then signaling that it would bail out troubled banks. Lehman apparently chose to play a game of chicken with the Treasury, hoping and expecting the Treasury would bail it out. When the Treasury finally refused, Lehman was pushed into liquidation because it hadn't prepared the way for Chapter 11. Chapter 11 also should have been used by Citigroup. Taxpayers took a bath on that one, for no good reason.

Bottom line: Detroit should get a hybrid vehicle, one third bailout and two-thirds Chapter 11 -- $1 of taxpayer investment for every $2 of sacrifice by Big Three stakeholders. But Wall Street should not get the second $350 billion tranche of the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Wall Street deserves -- and the public can do better if Wall Street utilizes -- Chapter 11.

Saturday, January 24, 2009

Friday, January 23, 2009

On college endowments

According to a study released yesterday by the National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO), the endowment fund of Harvard University is worth $34.6 billion, a 19.8% percent higher than a year ago. 76 colleges and universities sit on endowments over $1b. Even more impressively, almost every one of the 733 institutions analyzed reports a double-digit increase in the value of its fund. (Look up the endowment of your alma mater here.)

Chart 1 (click to enlarge)

The increase in the value of the endowments has been the result of at least two factors: risk taking and stock market bonanza. First, higher-education institutions invest large portions of their wealth on high-risk, high-return securities. On a dollar-weighted average, in 2007 they held a 47.4% of their funds in equities, an 18.2% in hedge funds, a 5.4% in private equity, and a 3.6% on venture capital investments. Wealthier universities hold riskier portfolios than the average. (See Chart 1.)

Second, average stock prices have increased almost every single year for over 25 years. In spite of the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2000, the inflation-adjusted Dow Jones Industrial Average Index ended 2007 at a level five times higher than in 1982. Even the most passive portfolio manager would have achieved high returns in this stock market.

Chart 2 (click to enlarge)

No surprise then that most universities have performed so well. Over the last ten years, the return on most endowments beats the S&P 500 index, which grew at a healthy 7.1% annual rate itself. (See Chart 2.) In the case of the largest portfolios, universities beat the market by a long shot.

News of these fabulous riches has prompted some sectors to demand that universities share more of their wealth. Lawmakers remind them that, as tax-exempt institutions, “they’re supposed to offer public benefit in return for (that) exemption.” Private foundations, which are also tax-exempt, are required by law to spend 5% each year; the average for colleges is 4.6%, with little variation across levels of wealth (see data). Parents, on the other hand, don’t understand why tuition keeps going up while universities continue to amass wealth. Little do they suspect that the cost of college is stoked by the self-interest of parents and students themselves, not that of universities.

The classic explanation for the rise of tuition is that the college premium —the positive gap between the earnings of college graduates and high school graduates— has increased the demand for college education, thereby raising its equilibrium price.

More interestingly, the stock market has also made tuition rates go up, according to a paper* by my former colleague at the University of Chicago Pablo Peña (pdf). Rises in asset prices increase the amount of resources available to universities. Part of that wealth is spent on inputs that improve the quality of education: more and better qualified professors, and newer and more sophisticated facilities, such as labs, computers and libraries, for instance. Higher quality, in turn, increases the amount of human capital accumulated in college, and ultimately affects life-time earnings, i.e. the returns to education. Prestige considerations may be at work too: celebrity professors and state-of-the-art facilities increase the reputation of the institution, adding to the value of the diploma. Therefore, larger endowments spur the demand for college education, and drive up tuition rates.

Differences in the value of endowments across universities are vast: the combined value of the top ten colleges represents 35% of total endowment assets. In light of Pablo’s theory, the implications of this inequality depend on what universities and colleges spend their money on.

If they continue to use their wealth to improve the quality of the service they provide, demand for college education and tuition levels will continue to rise. Differences in tuition rates and education quality between top-notch and second-tier institutions will continue to widen too, since endowments and asset returns are highly concentrated. Also, because the ablest students —those with highest SAT scores or best records of achievement in high school— benefit the most from the quality of college education, the matching of the best students with the best institutions will intensify. Differences in the quality of students across colleges will increase.

On the other hand, universities could start using their endowments to increase capacity or subsidize the cost of college. In this unlikely scenario, the equilibrium price of higher education will probably decline, the quality of college education will drop, and the college premium —the earnings of college graduates vis-à-vis high-school graduates— will drop.

Selected institutions have recently been announcing that they will increase financial aid. Recent announcements might suggest that this could actually happen among selected institutions. Harvard and Dartmouth have eliminated loans from their aid packages and will be giving grants instead; and Yale has followed in their footsteps. These de facto cuts in average tuition rates are not going to change the system. First, they won’t change the quality of education at top universities, for which the foregone tuition revenue is peanuts. Second, they won’t reduce the cost of attendance of the average college student, because the number of institutions that can afford foregoing tuition revenues is small.

But improved aid packages at top schools will make their programs affordable to the brightest students, regardless of their financial situation. If the newfound altruism of the Harvards and Yales has any effect, that will be an even more pronounced assortative matching of colleges and applicants by quality. The scope of these developments is very limited, but it’s good news —at least for believers, like myself, in a free, merit-based education system.

More data:
Tuition rates: table of nominal rates (html), graph of real rates (pdf, Figure 1)

Technorati tags: , , , ,

Thursday, January 22, 2009

On college endowments

According to a study released yesterday by the National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO), the endowment fund of Harvard University is worth $34.6 billion, a 19.8% percent higher than a year ago. 76 colleges and universities sit on endowments over $1b. Even more impressively, almost every one of the 733 institutions analyzed reports a double-digit increase in the value of its fund. (Look up the endowment of your alma mater here.)

Chart 1 (click to enlarge)

The increase in the value of the endowments has been the result of at least two factors: risk taking and stock market bonanza. First, higher-education institutions invest large portions of their wealth on high-risk, high-return securities. On a dollar-weighted average, in 2007 they held a 47.4% of their funds in equities, an 18.2% in hedge funds, a 5.4% in private equity, and a 3.6% on venture capital investments. Wealthier universities hold riskier portfolios than the average. (See Chart 1.)

Second, average stock prices have increased almost every single year for over 25 years. In spite of the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2000, the inflation-adjusted Dow Jones Industrial Average Index ended 2007 at a level five times higher than in 1982. Even the most passive portfolio manager would have achieved high returns in this stock market.

Chart 2 (click to enlarge)

No surprise then that most universities have performed so well. Over the last ten years, the return on most endowments beats the S&P 500 index, which grew at a healthy 7.1% annual rate itself. (See Chart 2.) In the case of the largest portfolios, universities beat the market by a long shot.

News of these fabulous riches has prompted some sectors to demand that universities share more of their wealth. Lawmakers remind them that, as tax-exempt institutions, “they’re supposed to offer public benefit in return for (that) exemption.” Private foundations, which are also tax-exempt, are required by law to spend 5% each year; the average for colleges is 4.6%, with little variation across levels of wealth (see data). Parents, on the other hand, don’t understand why tuition keeps going up while universities continue to amass wealth. Little do they suspect that the cost of college is stoked by the self-interest of parents and students themselves, not that of universities.

The classic explanation for the rise of tuition is that the college premium —the positive gap between the earnings of college graduates and high school graduates— has increased the demand for college education, thereby raising its equilibrium price.

More interestingly, the stock market has also made tuition rates go up, according to a paper* by my former colleague at the University of Chicago Pablo Peña (pdf). Rises in asset prices increase the amount of resources available to universities. Part of that wealth is spent on inputs that improve the quality of education: more and better qualified professors, and newer and more sophisticated facilities, such as labs, computers and libraries, for instance. Higher quality, in turn, increases the amount of human capital accumulated in college, and ultimately affects life-time earnings, i.e. the returns to education. Prestige considerations may be at work too: celebrity professors and state-of-the-art facilities increase the reputation of the institution, adding to the value of the diploma. Therefore, larger endowments spur the demand for college education, and drive up tuition rates.

Differences in the value of endowments across universities are vast: the combined value of the top ten colleges represents 35% of total endowment assets. In light of Pablo’s theory, the implications of this inequality depend on what universities and colleges spend their money on.

If they continue to use their wealth to improve the quality of the service they provide, demand for college education and tuition levels will continue to rise. Differences in tuition rates and education quality between top-notch and second-tier institutions will continue to widen too, since endowments and asset returns are highly concentrated. Also, because the ablest students —those with highest SAT scores or best records of achievement in high school— benefit the most from the quality of college education, the matching of the best students with the best institutions will intensify. Differences in the quality of students across colleges will increase.

On the other hand, universities could start using their endowments to increase capacity or subsidize the cost of college. In this unlikely scenario, the equilibrium price of higher education will probably decline, the quality of college education will drop, and the college premium —the earnings of college graduates vis-à-vis high-school graduates— will drop.

Selected institutions have recently been announcing that they will increase financial aid. Recent announcements might suggest that this could actually happen among selected institutions. Harvard and Dartmouth have eliminated loans from their aid packages and will be giving grants instead; and Yale has followed in their footsteps. These de facto cuts in average tuition rates are not going to change the system. First, they won’t change the quality of education at top universities, for which the foregone tuition revenue is peanuts. Second, they won’t reduce the cost of attendance of the average college student, because the number of institutions that can afford foregoing tuition revenues is small.

But improved aid packages at top schools will make their programs affordable to the brightest students, regardless of their financial situation. If the newfound altruism of the Harvards and Yales has any effect, that will be an even more pronounced assortative matching of colleges and applicants by quality. The scope of these developments is very limited, but it’s good news —at least for believers, like myself, in a free, merit-based education system.

More data:
Tuition rates: table of nominal rates (html), graph of real rates (pdf, Figure 1)

Technorati tags: , , , ,

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

On college endowments

According to a study released yesterday by the National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO), the endowment fund of Harvard University is worth $34.6 billion, a 19.8% percent higher than a year ago. 76 colleges and universities sit on endowments over $1b. Even more impressively, almost every one of the 733 institutions analyzed reports a double-digit increase in the value of its fund. (Look up the endowment of your alma mater here.)

Chart 1 (click to enlarge)

The increase in the value of the endowments has been the result of at least two factors: risk taking and stock market bonanza. First, higher-education institutions invest large portions of their wealth on high-risk, high-return securities. On a dollar-weighted average, in 2007 they held a 47.4% of their funds in equities, an 18.2% in hedge funds, a 5.4% in private equity, and a 3.6% on venture capital investments. Wealthier universities hold riskier portfolios than the average. (See Chart 1.)

Second, average stock prices have increased almost every single year for over 25 years. In spite of the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2000, the inflation-adjusted Dow Jones Industrial Average Index ended 2007 at a level five times higher than in 1982. Even the most passive portfolio manager would have achieved high returns in this stock market.

Chart 2 (click to enlarge)

No surprise then that most universities have performed so well. Over the last ten years, the return on most endowments beats the S&P 500 index, which grew at a healthy 7.1% annual rate itself. (See Chart 2.) In the case of the largest portfolios, universities beat the market by a long shot.

News of these fabulous riches has prompted some sectors to demand that universities share more of their wealth. Lawmakers remind them that, as tax-exempt institutions, “they’re supposed to offer public benefit in return for (that) exemption.” Private foundations, which are also tax-exempt, are required by law to spend 5% each year; the average for colleges is 4.6%, with little variation across levels of wealth (see data). Parents, on the other hand, don’t understand why tuition keeps going up while universities continue to amass wealth. Little do they suspect that the cost of college is stoked by the self-interest of parents and students themselves, not that of universities.

The classic explanation for the rise of tuition is that the college premium —the positive gap between the earnings of college graduates and high school graduates— has increased the demand for college education, thereby raising its equilibrium price.

More interestingly, the stock market has also made tuition rates go up, according to a paper* by my former colleague at the University of Chicago Pablo Peña (pdf). Rises in asset prices increase the amount of resources available to universities. Part of that wealth is spent on inputs that improve the quality of education: more and better qualified professors, and newer and more sophisticated facilities, such as labs, computers and libraries, for instance. Higher quality, in turn, increases the amount of human capital accumulated in college, and ultimately affects life-time earnings, i.e. the returns to education. Prestige considerations may be at work too: celebrity professors and state-of-the-art facilities increase the reputation of the institution, adding to the value of the diploma. Therefore, larger endowments spur the demand for college education, and drive up tuition rates.

Differences in the value of endowments across universities are vast: the combined value of the top ten colleges represents 35% of total endowment assets. In light of Pablo’s theory, the implications of this inequality depend on what universities and colleges spend their money on.

If they continue to use their wealth to improve the quality of the service they provide, demand for college education and tuition levels will continue to rise. Differences in tuition rates and education quality between top-notch and second-tier institutions will continue to widen too, since endowments and asset returns are highly concentrated. Also, because the ablest students —those with highest SAT scores or best records of achievement in high school— benefit the most from the quality of college education, the matching of the best students with the best institutions will intensify. Differences in the quality of students across colleges will increase.

On the other hand, universities could start using their endowments to increase capacity or subsidize the cost of college. In this unlikely scenario, the equilibrium price of higher education will probably decline, the quality of college education will drop, and the college premium —the earnings of college graduates vis-à-vis high-school graduates— will drop.

Selected institutions have recently been announcing that they will increase financial aid. Recent announcements might suggest that this could actually happen among selected institutions. Harvard and Dartmouth have eliminated loans from their aid packages and will be giving grants instead; and Yale has followed in their footsteps. These de facto cuts in average tuition rates are not going to change the system. First, they won’t change the quality of education at top universities, for which the foregone tuition revenue is peanuts. Second, they won’t reduce the cost of attendance of the average college student, because the number of institutions that can afford foregoing tuition revenues is small.

But improved aid packages at top schools will make their programs affordable to the brightest students, regardless of their financial situation. If the newfound altruism of the Harvards and Yales has any effect, that will be an even more pronounced assortative matching of colleges and applicants by quality. The scope of these developments is very limited, but it’s good news —at least for believers, like myself, in a free, merit-based education system.

More data:
Tuition rates: table of nominal rates (html), graph of real rates (pdf, Figure 1)

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Tuesday, January 20, 2009

Monday, January 19, 2009

Of Financial Capital and Human Capital: Why We're Bailing Out Wall Street While Allowing Our Schools to Get Clobbered

Our preoccupation with the immediate crisis of financial capital is causing us to overlook the bigger crisis in America's human capital. While we commit hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars to Wall Street, we're slashing our outlays for public education.

Education is largely funded by state and local governments whose revenues are plummeting. As consumers cut back, state sales and income taxes are shrinking; three quarters of the states are already facing budget crises. On average, state revenues account for half of public school budgets, and most of the funding of public colleges and universities. On top of this, home values are dropping, which means local property taxes are also taking a hit. Local property taxes account for 40 percent of local school budgets.

The result: Schools are being closed, teachers laid off, after-school programs cut, so-called “noncritical” subjects like history eliminated, and tuitions hiked at state colleges.

It's absurd. We’re bailing out every major bank to get financial capital flowing again. But we’re squeezing the main sources of our nation's human capital. Yet America's future competitiveness and the standard of living of our people depend largely our peoples’ skills, and our capacities to communicate and solve problems and innovate – not on our ability to borrow money.

What’s more, our human capital is rooted here, while financial capital moves around the globe at the speed of an electronic blip. Right now global capital markets are frozen, but the big money -- mostly in Asia and the Middle East -- and will come here, bailout or no bailout. At this point it's coming back as purchases of dollars or in the form of T-bills that are financing the Wall Street bailout. Eventually American assets will become so cheap that the money will come rushing here to buy up the bargains.

It’s our human capital that’s in short supply. And without adequatepublic funding, the supply will shrink further. Don't get me wrong: I’m not saying funding is everything when it comes to education. Obviously, accountability is important. But without adequate funding we can’t attract talented people into teaching, or keep class sizes small enough to give kids a real chance to learn, or provide them with a well-rounded curriculum, and ensure that every qualified young person can go to college.

So why are we bailing out Wall Street and not our nation’s public schools and colleges? Partly because the crisis in financial capital is immediate while our human capital crisis is unfolding gradually. But maybe it's also because we don’t have a central banker for America’s human capital – someone who warns us as loudly as Ben Bernanke did a few months ago when he was talking about Wall Street's meltdown, of the dire consequences that will follow if we don’t come up with the dough.

Sunday, January 18, 2009

Saturday, January 17, 2009

Income mobility and education


As goats on a tree, reaching for the best leaves, we all strive to be the ones at the top. But even in America, the land of opportunity, only good climbers make it. And lately even the fittest seem to be having a hard time.

The table below shows the percentage of people who moved from a given group in the income distribution to any other one, between 1994 and 2004. (The data come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and the income measure is household taxable earnings.) The lowest degree of income mobility occurs among the poorest and the wealthiest: 58% of households in the bottom 20% of the distribution stay there, and 60% of those in the wealthiest quintile don’t move either.



Pooling people from all ages together, however, can be misleading. The typical earnings profile over a lifetime is hump-shaped: earnings start low, rise up until the individual is in her 50s, then begin a slow decline, and fall sharply with retirement. Because of this non-monotonicity, movements up and down the earnings distribution may have little to do with climbing the social ladder.

As an example: suppose the economy is populated by two individuals, one of whom is 35 and earns $45,000, and the other one is 55 and makes $75,000. So the older person is at the top of the distribution. Ten years later, the young individual has accumulated experience and earns $65,000, whereas the older person, now 65, has retired and doesn’t earn any labor income. The younger individual is at the top of the earnings distribution now. If we were oblivious to the age of these individuals, this two-person society would look remarkably mobile: the poorer person moved to the top and vice versa. In reality, the observed mobility is the product of the normal course of earnings over peoples’ lives.

The fortunes of a person are more likely to change early in life. Twentysomethings are less likely to be attached to a house, a family, or a job. They job-hop, experiment, go back to school. Over time, some people land a dream job —or a “comfort job”— and stay there. And some others simply grow roots: they have mortgages to pay, and spouses and kids to drag along. We also become more risk averse with age.

The data bear these intuitions: 67% of households whose head was between 22 and 29 in 1994 had switched quintiles ten years later; 54% of those between 30 and 39 did so, about the same as among the 40-49 age group.

Things get much more interesting when I look at mobility within education groups. Schooling is probably the single most important factor determining a person’s chance to “make it.” People with less education are less employable. They also experience smaller changes in productivity, so their earnings curve is less steep. And they have fewer opportunities to fill high-powered positions —the sort that provide a pay boost if one is successful. In this, however, the evidence doesn't support my expectations.

Between 1975 and 1985, and within the group of college graduates, 61% of households moved to a different economic class, whereas 59% of high school graduates were mobile -barely a difference. And twenty years later, 54% of college grads and 60% of people with a high school degree were mobile. (See chart.)

Click to enlarge


What made the economic ladder more slippery for college grads? Following the reasoning above, maybe people have less appetite for risk, and are taking jobs that are safer but also offer fewer opportunities to leap-frog over income classes. Starting up a business, for instance, is one of the riskiest endeavors one could pursue. But statistics show that animal spirits have not subdued —the fraction of entrepreneurs and self-employed has risen over the last 30 years.

A second explanation is that unobserved ability, not education, is behind opportunity. A couple of decades ago earning a college degree was a major feat. Only the well-off, highly-motivated and bright ever put their feet in a University. Nowadays going to college is almost a given. As a result a college degree has become a weaker signal of one’s competence. Highly capable individuals still get ahead, but the vast majority of college graduates do not belong to that breed.

Finally, but not less importantly, it might be a problem of too many grads chasing too few jobs with incentive-based pay. In spite of all the talk about stock options, the number of positions with (significant) variable compensation has grown more slowly than the body of individuals with a University diploma. More well-educated people land jobs without the power or the incentives to rise fast on the pay scale.

This calcification of the white-collar society is worrying. More and more individuals go to graduate school in order to earn that M.B.A., M.A., or even Ph.D., that will give them an edge over their peers. That behavior is perfectly rational, and yet self-defeating. The latest batches of college grads remind me of hamsters on a wheel rather than goats.

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Friday, January 16, 2009

Risk Factors For A 2008 Recession

Here are the top risk factors for 2008 US Recession:

  • Continuing Housing Bust
  • High Oil Prices
  • Security Issues
  • Credit Crunch
  • High Consumer Debt
  • Large Trade Deficit
  • Consumer Spending is slowing (it makes up 70% of the US GDP)
  • Commercial Construction decline

Thursday, January 15, 2009

John Maynard Keynes: The Abridged Version

The notion that government deficits may be good has an odd ring these days. For most of the past two decades, America's biggest worry has been inflation brought on by excessive demand. Inflation soared into double digits in the 1970s, budget deficits ballooned in the '80s, Bill Clinton got great credit for erasing the deficit in the '90s, and George W. Bush then pushed deficits up again. But some 60 years ago, when 1 out of 4 adults couldn't find work, the problem was lack of demand. That old problem is now re-emerging.

Where do can we find guidance? One source: John Maynard Keynes.

Some background (via a piece I wrote several years ago):

Kaynes hardly seemed cut out to be a workingman's revolutionary. A Cambridge University don with a flair for making money, a graduate of England's exclusive Eton prep school, a collector of modern art, the darling of Virginia Woolf and her intellectually avant-garde Bloomsbury Group, the chairman of a life-insurance company, later a director of the Bank of England, married to a ballerina, John Maynard Keynes — tall, charming and self-confident — nonetheless transformed the dismal science into a revolutionary engine of social progress.

Before Keynes, economists were gloomy naysayers. "Nothing can be done," "Don't interfere," "It will never work," they intoned with Eeyore-like pessimism. But Keynes was an unswerving optimist. Of course we can lick unemployment! There's no reason to put up with recessions and depressions! The "economic problem is not — if we look into the future — the permanent problem of the human race," he wrote (liberally using italics for emphasis).

Born in Cambridge, England, in 1883, the year Karl Marx died, Keynes probably saved capitalism from itself and surely kept latter-day Marxists at bay.

His father John Neville Keynes was a noted Cambridge economist. His mother Florence Ada Keynes became mayor of Cambridge. Young John was a brilliant student but didn't immediately aspire to either academic or public life. He wanted to run a railroad. "It is so easy ... and fascinating to master the principles of these things," he told a friend, with his usual modesty. But no railway came along, and Keynes ended up taking the civil service exam. His lowest mark was in economics. "I evidently knew more about Economics than my examiners," he later explained.

Keynes was posted to the India Office, but the civil service proved deadly dull, and he soon left. He lectured at Cambridge, edited an influential journal, socialized with his Bloomsbury friends, surrounded himself with artists and writers and led an altogether dilettantish life until Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated in Sarajevo and Europe was plunged into World War I. Keynes was called to Britain's Treasury to work on overseas finances, where he quickly shone. Even his artistic tastes came in handy. He figured a way to balance the French accounts by having Britain's National Gallery buy paintings by Manet, Corot and Delacroix at bargain prices.

His first brush with fame came soon after the war, when he was selected to be a delegate to the Paris Peace Conference of 1918-19. The young Keynes held his tongue as Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau imposed vindictive war reparations on Germany. But he let out a roar when he returned to England, immediately writing a short book, The Economic Consequences of the Peace.

The Germans, he wrote acerbically, could not possibly pay what the victors were demanding. Calling Wilson a "blind, deaf Don Quixote" and Clemenceau a xenophobe with "one illusion — France, and one disillusion — mankind" (and only at the last moment scratching the purple prose he had reserved for Lloyd George: "this goat-footed bard, this half-human visitor to our age from the hag-ridden magic and enchanted woods of Celtic antiquity"), an outraged Keynes prophesied that the reparations would keep Germany impoverished and ultimately threaten all Europe.

His little book sold 84,000 copies, caused a huge stir and made Keynes an instant celebrity. But its real import was to be felt decades later, after the end of World War II. Instead of repeating the mistake made almost three decades before, the U.S. and Britain bore in mind Keynes' earlier admonition. The surest pathway to a lasting peace, they then understood, was to help the vanquished rebuild. Public investing on a grand scale would create trading partners that could turn around and buy the victors' exports, and also build solid middle-class democracies in Germany, Italy and Japan.

Yet Keynes' largest influence came from a convoluted, badly organized and in places nearly incomprehensible tome published in 1936, during the depths of the Great Depression. It was called "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money."

Keynes' basic idea was simple. In order to keep people fully employed, governments have to run deficits when the economy is slowing. That's because the private sector won't invest enough. As their markets become saturated, businesses reduce their investments, setting in motion a dangerous cycle: less investment, fewer jobs, less consumption and even less reason for business to invest. The economy may reach perfect balance, but at a cost of high unemployment and social misery. Better for governments to avoid the pain in the first place by taking up the slack.

Keynes had a hard sell, even in the depths of the Depression. Most economists of the era rejected his idea and favored balanced budgets. Most politicians didn't understand his idea to begin with. "Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist," Keynes wrote.

In the 1932 presidential election, Franklin D. Roosevelt had blasted Herbert Hoover for running a deficit, and dutifully promised he would balance the budget if elected.

Keynes' visit to the White House two years later to urge F.D.R. to do more deficit spending wasn't exactly a blazing success. "He left a whole rigmarole of figures," a bewildered F.D.R. complained to Labor Secretary Frances Perkins. "He must be a mathematician rather than a political economist." Keynes was equally underwhelmed, telling Perkins that he had "supposed the President was more literate, economically speaking."

As the Depression wore on, Roosevelt tried public works, farm subsidies and other devices to restart the economy, but he never completely gave up trying to balance the budget. In 1938 the Depression deepened. Reluctantly, F.D.R. embraced the only new idea he hadn't yet tried, that of the bewildering British "mathematician." As the President explained in a fireside chat, "We suffer primarily from a failure of consumer demand because of a lack of buying power." It was therefore up to the government to "create an economic upturn" by making "additions to the purchasing power of the nation."

Yet not until the U.S. entered World War II did F.D.R. try Keynes' idea on a scale necessary to pull the nation out of the doldrums — and Roosevelt, of course, had little choice. The big surprise was just how productive America could be when given the chance. Between 1939 and 1944 (the peak of wartime production), the nation's output almost doubled, and unemployment plummeted — from more than 17% to just over 1%.

Never before had an economic theory been so dramatically tested. Even granted the special circumstances of war mobilization, it seemed to work exactly as Keynes predicted. The grand experiment even won over many Republicans. America's Employment Act of 1946 — the year Keynes died — codified the new wisdom, making it "the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government ...to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power."

And so the Federal Government did, for the next quarter-century. As the U.S. economy boomed, the government became the nation's economic manager and the President its Manager in Chief. It became accepted wisdom that government could "fine-tune" the economy, pushing the twin accelerators of fiscal and monetary policy in order to avoid slowdowns, and applying the brakes when necessary to avoid overheating. In 1964 Lyndon Johnson cut taxes to expand purchasing power and boost employment. "We are all Keynesians now," Richard Nixon famously proclaimed. Americans still take for granted that Washington has responsibility for steering the economy clear of the shoals, although it's now usually the Fed chief rather than the President who carries most of the responsibility.

Keynes had no patience with economic theorists who assumed that everything would work out in the long run. "This long run is a misleading guide to current affairs," he wrote early in his career. "In the long run we are all dead."

Wednesday, January 14, 2009

Tuesday, January 13, 2009

Personal bankruptcy and consumption smoothing

The welfare effects of bankruptcy legislation are not correctly understood. Policymakers and the general public think, for the most part, that laws that protect borrowers in the event of default are beneficial to consumers. In practice, however, those laws have negative effects on the households that need credit most — and, ironically, those whom the legislation was intended to protect.

Traditionally, Chapter 7 has been the most popular type of bankruptcy filing. Under that section of the Bankruptcy Code, a filer relinquishes her assets, minus a certain exempted amount, and in return is discharged from her unsecured debt (credit card debt, personal loans, student loans, etc.).

State law sets those exempted amounts. In Illinois, for instance, exemptions are: $7,500 for home equity, $1,200 for motor vehicles, $750 for tools of the trade, and $2,000 for any other generic property. So suppose that you file for bankruptcy in the “Land of Lincoln,” and that you have $20,000 worth of home equity, and a car with a market value of $600. Then you can sell the house and keep $7,500 of the proceeds, and sell your car and keep the $600 (since that’s below the $1,200 limit).

Since 1978, with the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act (BRA), there’s also a federal exemption. Some states allow filers to choose between the state and the federal amounts. Obviously, if given the opportunity, filers use whichever is highest.

There is an enormous disparity of bankruptcy exemptions across states, even after accounting for the existence of the federal limits. For example, in 2006 the states of Texas, Florida, Oklahoma, Iowa, Kansas, South Dakota, and the District of Columbia, all allowed for an unlimited homestead exemption. In the states of Ohio and Virginia, at the other extreme, the limit is set at $5,000 (and those states don’t allow for the application of the federal exemption). The map below shows the maximum exemption that a married homeowner could claim in 2003, after combining homestead and non-homestead amounts, and taking the highest of the state and federal limit (where the federal limit is available). The limits also vary over time, although high-exemption states tend to remain the same over the years.

Bankruptcy exemptions under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code
(in 2003, for a home owner)
Click to enlarge

The amount of the exemption provides insurance for the debtor’s consumption. Suppose that a debtor suffers a setback, such as illness or unemployment, and that she is forced to default on her credit card debt and student loans. In the absence of any exemption, creditors would take a blanket security interest in all of the debtor’s possessions. The existence of an exemption means that she is left with at least a small amount of assets after filing for bankruptcy. Legislators see it as a way to provide a “fresh start.” An alternative view is that a certain amount of assets, and hence consumption, are insured against negative events.

On the other side of the coin, lenders are hurt by this form of consumer protection. Higher exemptions reduce the payments received by the lender in the event of default, and increase the probability of bankruptcy, since the borrower’s punishment for doing so becomes smaller. Creditors rationally respond to higher exemptions by raising interest rates and rationing credit. This rationing may take the form of fewer households with access to debt, smaller loans, or both. Fewer and smaller loans reduce the amount of consumption that households can finance with debt in times of low income.

In theory, then, bankruptcy exemptions have an ambiguous effect on consumption smoothing. Higher exemptions allow bankrupt households to keep more assets; but those same higher exemptions reduce the supply of credit. It is, therefore, an empirical matter whether higher limits enhance or detract from the role of debt as a consumption insurance mechanism.

To answer that question, I put together data on consumption and lay-offs of American households (from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics), as well as bankruptcy exemptions, for as many years as I could get consistent data for. (In practice, that is 1976 through 2003, with the exception of 1994-1997.) The idea is to estimate by how much a family’s consumption is reduced when its main income earner gets laid off, and see how much the hit to consumption changes with the bankruptcy exemption.

As a warm-up and point of reference, I estimate that, without taking into account the exemptions, a household whose breadwinner gets laid off reduces its consumption by five to six percent. Once I include bankruptcy laws in the econometric analysis, I find that households that live in states with unlimited exemptions reduce their consumption by 16 to 18 percent. Households in the top third of the distribution of (limited) exemptions reduce their consumption by nine to ten percent. For households with lower exemptions the effect of unemployment on consumption is low and statistically insignificant. (See chart.)

Click to enlarge

My interpretation of the results is that consumer debt is an important mechanism of consumption insurance. People use loans and credit card debt not only to finance big-ticket items, but also to make ends meet when disaster strikes. Legislation that makes it harder to obtain debt, such as bankruptcy exemptions or interest rate caps, ends up punishing the weakest: people with low wealth, who could make the most use of credit as an insurance device.


Don’t get me wrong: this is not a call to eliminate bankruptcy exemptions. There is a place for them as a means to provide safety to people who have been struck by unexpected events. A zero-exemption policy would probably expand credit supply — at the cost of leaving thousands of families destitute and without a chance to recover. But exorbitant homestead exemptions go way beyond providing a chance for a “fresh start.” Likewise, there’s no reason why people should be allowed to keep $60,000 worth of personal property, as they can do in Texas.

Surely, medical expenses can easily run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. But that’s a reason to reform health insurance. Limiting the enforceability of credit contracts is a bad way to lay out safety nets.

This post was based on my own research. The write-up of the paper is still in the making. It will be available on my website by January 28. In the meantime, you can have a look at the slides I prepared for a presentation this Friday.

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Monday, January 12, 2009

Recession Fears Grow

Reuters reports that "Unsold goods are piling up in warehouses as the housing meltdown and soaring oil prices strain consumers, raising fears that already glum fourth-quarter growth prospects may tip toward recession."

"The sluggishness is apparent in the retail sector, where 70 percent of chain stores posted weaker-than-expected October sales results, according to research firm Retail Metrics.

"We expect the challenging retail environment to continue for the foreseeable future," Mike Ullman, chairman and chief executive officer of department store chain J.C. Penney (JCP.N: Quote, Profile, Research), said last week. He added that the company would keep inventory levels tight through 2008."

Respected economist Nouriel Roubini writes "Any recession call for the U.S. is clearly dependent on US consumption faltering. Since residential investment is only 5% of even a worsening housing recession cannot – by itself – trigger an economy-wide recession. Rather, since private consumption is over 70% of aggregate demand a sharp and persistent slowdown in consumption growth – below 1% or even negative - is necessary to trigger a full blown recession

Sunday, January 11, 2009

The Great Crash of 2008

If this isn't a Great Crash I don't know how to define one. Stocks were down another 7 percent today. Since the peak of last year, major stock indexes have dropped 47 percent. We're in range of the Great Crash of 1929.

Why is the Great Crash of 2008 happening? First, because investors are beginning to understand the enormity of the bubble economy that began to form in the late 1990s when all contraints were lifted on borrowing in order to buy everything that was assumed to be increasing in value -- starting with houses and including securities and shares of stock themselves. So-called "margin requirements," first instituted in the wake of the Great Crash of 1929, were all but abandoned, as big banks and hedge funds found ways around them.

Even more important, investors are starting to fathom the emptiness of American consumers' wallets. Retail sales last Friday and Saturday -- the first days of the Christmas buying season -- were disappointing. Had retailers not discounted to the point of taking losses, sales would have been abysmal. In other words, consumers have gone on strike.

Why have they gone on strike? Not because of the difficulty of getting credit. Most consumers can barely afford to pay the interest charges on the debt they're already carrying. Consumers have gone on strike because their earnings haven't kept up. The recovery that officially ended December, 2007 (the National Bureau of Economic Research now tells us) was the first on record in which median earnings declined, adjusted for inflation. Since then, many people have also lost their jobs or are working part time when they'd rather be working full time, or else know they're in danger of losing their jobs.

The speculative bubble still has some air in it; asset values will continue to drop before they hit bottom. That will take at least a year, possibly two. But don't expect asset values to bounce substantially back, even then. The only way to revive Wall Street is to revive Main Street, and the only way to accomplish this is to get America back on the course of rising median incomes.

Saturday, January 10, 2009

Who's Paying For Your Fix?

by Kate Duncan


May/Jun 2003 Issue


Unless your morning latte was a fair trade blend, it probably cost more than what the farmer who picked the beans earns in a day.


Conventional coffee prices are at their lowest in a century, even below the cost of production. Farmers have been leaving the fruit to rot on the tree, pulling the kids out of school, abandoning the family land and pouring into the cities to find non-existent work. That’s why, as the most heavily traded commodity after oil, and the most common beverage after water, coffee is a major focus of the fair trade movement.


If your morning latte was a fair trade brew, it means the person who farmed the beans is earning enough to support his family. This is all well and good, but the way fair trade is usually explained - with prices, numbers and statistics - ignores it’s lasting benefits. The true point of fair trade is the cultural, communal, and environmental stability it bolsters.


A farmer who sells through fair trade is a member of a cooperative that is a vehicle for community empowerment. And not just a neighborhood watch: The people typically organized via fair trade are those whom the free market has filtered to the lowest economic stratum. Rather than maneuvering them into a position where they’re forced to take what they can get, fair trade recognizes farmers as equal partners, a platform from which they can command more control over their business and lives.


'Fair trade is a different kind of business relationship between the producer and buyer, which has been an inspiration to help these communities pull together instead of caving to the pressure of all the things trying to blow them apart,' says Monika Firl. Monika heads up producer relations for Cooperative Coffees, and as such, led half a dozen coffee roasters and me (as a grateful representative of Idyll Development Foundation, one of Cooperative Coffee’s funders) on a buying trip to farmers’ co-ops in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Mexico in February, where we were able to see the effect for ourselves. [Clamor]

Friday, January 9, 2009

A bash for confidence indexes

Every month the University of Michigan and the Conference Board conduct a survey of households’ confidence on the state of the economy. Each pollster asks several questions and summarizes the results with an index, which is closely watched for signs of consumer distress. Last November, the Michigan index fell by 4.8 points from October; the Conference Board Index dipped by 7.9 points. Supposedly this is bad news because worried consumers are thrifty consumers. Don’t let the surveys fool you: they are almost complete rubbish — unless you know how to use them.


At first glance, both the Michigan index (MI) and the Conference Board index (CI) are correlated with the business cycle: they sink around the beginning of a recession and rebound near the end (see chart nearby, originally published by the Wall Street Journal). They even seem to track the quarter-to-quarter growth of consumption expenditures. Look a bit closer, however, and you’ll see that confidence and reality get out of synch sometimes. For instance, both the MI and the CI were abnormally low relative to consumption growth in 1992-1993, and again during 2002 and 2003. The indices dipped during the Asian crisis of 1998, but consumption growth didn’t budge; conversely, expenditure growth fell dramatically in early 1995 even though sentiment didn’t change.

Formal statistical analyses have found that consumer sentiment says very little that forecasters don’t know already. That is, once this quarter’s spending, interest rates, etc. are known, it does not help much to predict future spending growth. Confidence and expectations matter. The issue, I reckon, is that these particular indices fail to capture them.

A cursory look at the guts of the MI and the CI will convince you that they are literally meaningless. Each of them is a mishmash of five opinions — which, by the way, are not the same for both surveys (see table below). The questionnaires represent but the pollster’s guess of what determines spending. There’s no guarantee that the questions are the ones that actually matter.

Click to enlarge


For instance, the MI doesn’t include questions on job security, whereas the CI doesn’t ask about present personal finances. The potential irrelevance of the surveys becomes painfully clear when one examines the first question of the MI: “Do you think now is a good or bad time for people to buy major household items?” With such a specific wording, that question should predict expenditures on cars, appliances, furniture and such, i.e. durable goods. But once past purchases are included into the forecasting model, confidence and expenditures are barely correlated. [1]

Even if one of the indexes had the right composition, there’s no reason why all the questions should be given equal weights. Personal finances and availability of jobs, for example, may influence a consumer’s expenditures more than overall business conditions; short-term prospects should matter more than distant ones. In both the MI and the CI, however, every question counts the same.


Despite my bashing of the indexes, the surveys are worth keeping. Each of them contains some question that can help predict one or other component of expenditures. More specifically, the Conference Board’s questions about job prospects help forecast expenditures on durable goods: sentiment about the current job situation (question number two in the table) significantly predicts purchases of vehicles and other durables; expectations about future jobs (question four) predicts expenditures on vehicles only. [1] The Michigan survey, on the other hand, contains questions which are not used in the indexes. It would be worth exploring whether they are useful for forecasters.

Unfortunately, the component questions are not accessible to most people. If they are, it’s only with significant delay. And even if they were published timely, most people wouldn’t be able to use them because they can’t handle the number crunching. So here’s my advice for the everyday news consumer. First, don’t draw any conclusions from month-to-month changes of the indexes, no matter how large they are. Start believing them only after several months of consecutive rises or declines. Second, the Conference Board index is a better predictor than the Michigan index, because the latter doesn’t include any question about jobs. Third, rather than sentiment indicators, pay attention to data on the labor market: the unemployment rate and the payroll numbers, for example, averaged over at least three months. Not only do they gauge consumers’ confidence more accurately than the confidence indexes themselves: they influence spending decisions directly (the more unemployment, the less disposable income).

In all fairness, the intention of the MI and the CI was never to forecast any specific variable. They were designed over 40 years ago as a rough measure of the households’ view of the state of the economy. Even if the surveys captured expectations correctly, it should be up to economists, not statisticians, pollsters or newspapers, to figure out how those expectations translate into realized outcomes. Some day we’ll know how to do it. I’m pretty confident.

References and further reading:

[1] Bram and Ludvigson (1998) Does consumer confidence forecast household expenditure? A sentiment index horserace (pdf)

[2] Carroll, Fuhrer and Wilcox (1994) Does consumer sentiment forecast household spending? If so, why? (pdf)

[3] Croushore (2006) Consumer confidence surveys: can they help us forecast consumer spending in real time? (pdf)

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Thursday, January 8, 2009

A bash for confidence indexes

Every month the University of Michigan and the Conference Board conduct a survey of households’ confidence on the state of the economy. Each pollster asks several questions and summarizes the results with an index, which is closely watched for signs of consumer distress. Last November, the Michigan index fell by 4.8 points from October; the Conference Board Index dipped by 7.9 points. Supposedly this is bad news because worried consumers are thrifty consumers. Don’t let the surveys fool you: they are almost complete rubbish — unless you know how to use them.


At first glance, both the Michigan index (MI) and the Conference Board index (CI) are correlated with the business cycle: they sink around the beginning of a recession and rebound near the end (see chart nearby, originally published by the Wall Street Journal). They even seem to track the quarter-to-quarter growth of consumption expenditures. Look a bit closer, however, and you’ll see that confidence and reality get out of synch sometimes. For instance, both the MI and the CI were abnormally low relative to consumption growth in 1992-1993, and again during 2002 and 2003. The indices dipped during the Asian crisis of 1998, but consumption growth didn’t budge; conversely, expenditure growth fell dramatically in early 1995 even though sentiment didn’t change.

Formal statistical analyses have found that consumer sentiment says very little that forecasters don’t know already. That is, once this quarter’s spending, interest rates, etc. are known, it does not help much to predict future spending growth. Confidence and expectations matter. The issue, I reckon, is that these particular indices fail to capture them.

A cursory look at the guts of the MI and the CI will convince you that they are literally meaningless. Each of them is a mishmash of five opinions — which, by the way, are not the same for both surveys (see table below). The questionnaires represent but the pollster’s guess of what determines spending. There’s no guarantee that the questions are the ones that actually matter.

Click to enlarge


For instance, the MI doesn’t include questions on job security, whereas the CI doesn’t ask about present personal finances. The potential irrelevance of the surveys becomes painfully clear when one examines the first question of the MI: “Do you think now is a good or bad time for people to buy major household items?” With such a specific wording, that question should predict expenditures on cars, appliances, furniture and such, i.e. durable goods. But once past purchases are included into the forecasting model, confidence and expenditures are barely correlated. [1]

Even if one of the indexes had the right composition, there’s no reason why all the questions should be given equal weights. Personal finances and availability of jobs, for example, may influence a consumer’s expenditures more than overall business conditions; short-term prospects should matter more than distant ones. In both the MI and the CI, however, every question counts the same.


Despite my bashing of the indexes, the surveys are worth keeping. Each of them contains some question that can help predict one or other component of expenditures. More specifically, the Conference Board’s questions about job prospects help forecast expenditures on durable goods: sentiment about the current job situation (question number two in the table) significantly predicts purchases of vehicles and other durables; expectations about future jobs (question four) predicts expenditures on vehicles only. [1] The Michigan survey, on the other hand, contains questions which are not used in the indexes. It would be worth exploring whether they are useful for forecasters.

Unfortunately, the component questions are not accessible to most people. If they are, it’s only with significant delay. And even if they were published timely, most people wouldn’t be able to use them because they can’t handle the number crunching. So here’s my advice for the everyday news consumer. First, don’t draw any conclusions from month-to-month changes of the indexes, no matter how large they are. Start believing them only after several months of consecutive rises or declines. Second, the Conference Board index is a better predictor than the Michigan index, because the latter doesn’t include any question about jobs. Third, rather than sentiment indicators, pay attention to data on the labor market: the unemployment rate and the payroll numbers, for example, averaged over at least three months. Not only do they gauge consumers’ confidence more accurately than the confidence indexes themselves: they influence spending decisions directly (the more unemployment, the less disposable income).

In all fairness, the intention of the MI and the CI was never to forecast any specific variable. They were designed over 40 years ago as a rough measure of the households’ view of the state of the economy. Even if the surveys captured expectations correctly, it should be up to economists, not statisticians, pollsters or newspapers, to figure out how those expectations translate into realized outcomes. Some day we’ll know how to do it. I’m pretty confident.

References and further reading:

[1] Bram and Ludvigson (1998) Does consumer confidence forecast household expenditure? A sentiment index horserace (pdf)

[2] Carroll, Fuhrer and Wilcox (1994) Does consumer sentiment forecast household spending? If so, why? (pdf)

[3] Croushore (2006) Consumer confidence surveys: can they help us forecast consumer spending in real time? (pdf)

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