Recession Fears Grow

Reuters reports that "Unsold goods are piling up in warehouses as the housing meltdown and soaring oil prices strain consumers, raising fears that already glum fourth-quarter growth prospects may tip toward recession."

"The sluggishness is apparent in the retail sector, where 70 percent of chain stores posted weaker-than-expected October sales results, according to research firm Retail Metrics.

"We expect the challenging retail environment to continue for the foreseeable future," Mike Ullman, chairman and chief executive officer of department store chain J.C. Penney (JCP.N: Quote, Profile, Research), said last week. He added that the company would keep inventory levels tight through 2008."

Respected economist Nouriel Roubini writes "Any recession call for the U.S. is clearly dependent on US consumption faltering. Since residential investment is only 5% of even a worsening housing recession cannot – by itself – trigger an economy-wide recession. Rather, since private consumption is over 70% of aggregate demand a sharp and persistent slowdown in consumption growth – below 1% or even negative - is necessary to trigger a full blown recession

The Myth of Summer Vacation

I'm about to take a few weeks off. If you are, too, we're in the minority. A Conference Board poll last April found fewer than 40 percent of Americans planning a summer vacation.

Of course, for most Americans, there's not much summer vacation to begin with. The average American employee gets a total of 14 days off each year. If you want to take a few of them around Thanksgiving, between Christmas and New Years, and maybe when the kids are home on spring break, summer vacation is already practically gone.

Those 14 days, by the way, are the fewest vacation days in any advanced economy. The average French worker gets 37 days off annually; In Britain, it's 26.

And even when we take those 14 days, we don't always get paid for them. The Bureau of Labor Statistics tells us 1 out of 4 workers gets no paid vacation days at all. Every other advanced nation -- and even lots of developing nations -- mandate them.

On top of all this comes the current economic squeeze. That figure of 40 percent of Americans planning a summer vacation is the lowest in 30 years.

Not incidentally, consumer confidence in the economy is the lowest it's been in 28 years. In other words, there's a correlation between the small number of Americans taking a vacation this summer and this very bad economy.

It's not that we're too busy to vacation. Just the opposite: There's not enough work go around. Which means we don't dare leave work, lest we lose us a customer who might just happen to want us when we're gone. Or we could even lose the job, because employees on vacation might seem expendable to an employer looking for a way to cut costs.

Despite all this, you need a summer vacation. I do, too. I'll return in August.

Who's Paying For Your Fix?

by Kate Duncan

May/Jun 2003 Issue

Unless your morning latte was a fair trade blend, it probably cost more than what the farmer who picked the beans earns in a day.

Conventional coffee prices are at their lowest in a century, even below the cost of production. Farmers have been leaving the fruit to rot on the tree, pulling the kids out of school, abandoning the family land and pouring into the cities to find non-existent work. That’s why, as the most heavily traded commodity after oil, and the most common beverage after water, coffee is a major focus of the fair trade movement.

If your morning latte was a fair trade brew, it means the person who farmed the beans is earning enough to support his family. This is all well and good, but the way fair trade is usually explained - with prices, numbers and statistics - ignores it’s lasting benefits. The true point of fair trade is the cultural, communal, and environmental stability it bolsters.

A farmer who sells through fair trade is a member of a cooperative that is a vehicle for community empowerment. And not just a neighborhood watch: The people typically organized via fair trade are those whom the free market has filtered to the lowest economic stratum. Rather than maneuvering them into a position where they’re forced to take what they can get, fair trade recognizes farmers as equal partners, a platform from which they can command more control over their business and lives.

'Fair trade is a different kind of business relationship between the producer and buyer, which has been an inspiration to help these communities pull together instead of caving to the pressure of all the things trying to blow them apart,' says Monika Firl. Monika heads up producer relations for Cooperative Coffees, and as such, led half a dozen coffee roasters and me (as a grateful representative of Idyll Development Foundation, one of Cooperative Coffee’s funders) on a buying trip to farmers’ co-ops in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Mexico in February, where we were able to see the effect for ourselves. [Clamor]

A bash for confidence indexes

Every month the University of Michigan and the Conference Board conduct a survey of households’ confidence on the state of the economy. Each pollster asks several questions and summarizes the results with an index, which is closely watched for signs of consumer distress. Last November, the Michigan index fell by 4.8 points from October; the Conference Board Index dipped by 7.9 points. Supposedly this is bad news because worried consumers are thrifty consumers. Don’t let the surveys fool you: they are almost complete rubbish — unless you know how to use them.


At first glance, both the Michigan index (MI) and the Conference Board index (CI) are correlated with the business cycle: they sink around the beginning of a recession and rebound near the end (see chart nearby, originally published by the Wall Street Journal). They even seem to track the quarter-to-quarter growth of consumption expenditures. Look a bit closer, however, and you’ll see that confidence and reality get out of synch sometimes. For instance, both the MI and the CI were abnormally low relative to consumption growth in 1992-1993, and again during 2002 and 2003. The indices dipped during the Asian crisis of 1998, but consumption growth didn’t budge; conversely, expenditure growth fell dramatically in early 1995 even though sentiment didn’t change.

Formal statistical analyses have found that consumer sentiment says very little that forecasters don’t know already. That is, once this quarter’s spending, interest rates, etc. are known, it does not help much to predict future spending growth. Confidence and expectations matter. The issue, I reckon, is that these particular indices fail to capture them.

A cursory look at the guts of the MI and the CI will convince you that they are literally meaningless. Each of them is a mishmash of five opinions — which, by the way, are not the same for both surveys (see table below). The questionnaires represent but the pollster’s guess of what determines spending. There’s no guarantee that the questions are the ones that actually matter.

Click to enlarge

For instance, the MI doesn’t include questions on job security, whereas the CI doesn’t ask about present personal finances. The potential irrelevance of the surveys becomes painfully clear when one examines the first question of the MI: “Do you think now is a good or bad time for people to buy major household items?” With such a specific wording, that question should predict expenditures on cars, appliances, furniture and such, i.e. durable goods. But once past purchases are included into the forecasting model, confidence and expenditures are barely correlated. [1]

Even if one of the indexes had the right composition, there’s no reason why all the questions should be given equal weights. Personal finances and availability of jobs, for example, may influence a consumer’s expenditures more than overall business conditions; short-term prospects should matter more than distant ones. In both the MI and the CI, however, every question counts the same.


Despite my bashing of the indexes, the surveys are worth keeping. Each of them contains some question that can help predict one or other component of expenditures. More specifically, the Conference Board’s questions about job prospects help forecast expenditures on durable goods: sentiment about the current job situation (question number two in the table) significantly predicts purchases of vehicles and other durables; expectations about future jobs (question four) predicts expenditures on vehicles only. [1] The Michigan survey, on the other hand, contains questions which are not used in the indexes. It would be worth exploring whether they are useful for forecasters.

Unfortunately, the component questions are not accessible to most people. If they are, it’s only with significant delay. And even if they were published timely, most people wouldn’t be able to use them because they can’t handle the number crunching. So here’s my advice for the everyday news consumer. First, don’t draw any conclusions from month-to-month changes of the indexes, no matter how large they are. Start believing them only after several months of consecutive rises or declines. Second, the Conference Board index is a better predictor than the Michigan index, because the latter doesn’t include any question about jobs. Third, rather than sentiment indicators, pay attention to data on the labor market: the unemployment rate and the payroll numbers, for example, averaged over at least three months. Not only do they gauge consumers’ confidence more accurately than the confidence indexes themselves: they influence spending decisions directly (the more unemployment, the less disposable income).

In all fairness, the intention of the MI and the CI was never to forecast any specific variable. They were designed over 40 years ago as a rough measure of the households’ view of the state of the economy. Even if the surveys captured expectations correctly, it should be up to economists, not statisticians, pollsters or newspapers, to figure out how those expectations translate into realized outcomes. Some day we’ll know how to do it. I’m pretty confident.

References and further reading:

[1] Bram and Ludvigson (1998) Does consumer confidence forecast household expenditure? A sentiment index horserace (pdf)

[2] Carroll, Fuhrer and Wilcox (1994) Does consumer sentiment forecast household spending? If so, why? (pdf)

[3] Croushore (2006) Consumer confidence surveys: can they help us forecast consumer spending in real time? (pdf)

Technorati tags: economics, consumer confidence, consumer sentiment, forecasting, expectations

Housing Bubble Sites

National Sites

• The Housing Bubble
• The House Bubble
• Housing Panic
• Paper Economy a US Real Estate Bubble Blog
• Housing Doom Housing Bubble
• Doctor Housing Bubble
• Bubble Markets Inventory Tracking
• Priced Out Fovever
• HousingTracker
• Matrix
• The Real Estate Bloggers
• The Mortgage Lender Implode-O-Meter
• Housing Bubble Casualty
• Housing Bubble Bust
• Bubble Pictures
• Bubble News Network
• Lawrence Yun Watch
• Is There a Housing Bubble
• Real Estate Comments

Regional Sites

• DC Home Prices
• Greater Northern VA Housing Bubble Fallout
• Frankly Realty (Virginia)
• Baltimore Metro Area Housing Blog
• Baltimore Housing Bubble
• Chicago Bubble Blog
• Irvine Housing Bubble
• The Jersey Shore RE Bubble
• New Jersey Real Estate Report
• Socket Site (San Francisco)
• Patrick.net (San Francisco)
• Bay Area Real Estate Blog
• Burbed (San Francisco)
• Marin Real Estate Bubble
• Sonoma Housing Bubble
• Seattle Bubble
• Calgary Contrarian
• Vancouver Housing Market Blog
• SoCal Real Estate Bubble Blog
• Flippers in Trouble (Sacramento)
• Portland Housing
• Proffesor Piggington (San Deigo)
• Pacific Beach Bubble
• Boston Bubble
• California Housing Forecast
• Massachusetts Housing Market
• Vancouver Condo Info
• New York City Housing Bubble

The Heart of the Economic Mess

The Federal Reserve Board's "beige book" for June and July offers a clear explanation for why the economy has slowed to a crawl. It shows American consumers cutting way back on their purchases of everything from food to cars to appliances to name-brand products. As they do so, employers inevitably are cutting back on the hours they need people to work for them, thereby contributing to a downward spiral.

The normal remedies for economic downturns are necessary. But even an adequate stimulus package will offer only temporary relief this time, because this isn’t a normal downturn. The problem lies deeper. Most Americans can no longer maintain their standard of living. The only lasting remedy is to improve their standard of living by widening the circle of prosperity.

The heart of the matter isn't the collapse in housing prices or even the frenetic rise in oil and food prices. These are contributing to the mess but they are not creating it directly. The basic reality is this: For most Americans, earnings have not kept up with the cost of living. This is not a new phenomenon but it has finally caught up with the pocketbooks of average people. If you look at the earnings of non-government workers, especially the hourly workers who comprise 80 percent of the workforce, you'll find they are barely higher than they were in the mid-1970s, adjusted for inflation. The income of a man in his 30s is now 12 percent below that of a man his age three decades ago. Per-person productivity has grown considerably since then, but most Americans have not reaped the benefits of those productivity gains. They've gone largely to the top.

Inequality on this scale is bad for many reasons but it is also bad for the economy. The wealthy devote a smaller percentage of their earnings to buying things than the rest of us because, after all, they’re rich. They already have most of what they want. Instead of buying, the very wealthy are more likely to invest their earnings wherever around the world they can get the highest return.

This underlying earnings problem has been masked for years as middle- and lower-income Americans found means to live beyond their paychecks. But they have now run out of such coping mechanisms. As I've noted elsewhere, the first coping mechanism was to send more women into paid work. Most women streamed into the work force in the 1970s less because new professional opportunities opened up to them than because they had to prop up family incomes. The percentage of American working mothers with school-age children has almost doubled since 1970 — to more than 70 percent. But there’s a limit to how many mothers can maintain paying jobs.

So Americans turned to a second way of spending beyond their hourly wages. They worked more hours. The typical American now works more each year than he or she did three decades ago. Americans became veritable workaholics, putting in 350 more hours a year than the average European, more even than the notoriously industrious Japanese.

But there’s also a limit to how many hours Americans can put into work, so Americans turned to a third coping mechanism. They began to borrow. With housing prices rising briskly through the 1990s and even faster from 2002 to 2006, they turned their homes into piggy banks by refinancing home mortgages and taking out home-equity loans. But this third strategy also had a built-in limit. And now, with the bursting of the housing bubble, the piggy banks are closing. Americans are reaching the end of their ability to borrow and lenders have reached the end of their capacity to lend. Credit-card debt, meanwhile, has reached dangerous proportions. Banks are now pulling back.

As a result, typical Americans have run out of coping mechanisms to keep up their standard of living. That means there's not enough purhasing power in the economy to buy all the goods and services it's producing. We’re finally reaping the whirlwind of widening inequality and ever more concentrated wealth.

The only way to keep the economy going over the long run is to increase the real earnings of middle and lower-middle class Americans. The answer is not to protect jobs through trade protection. That would only drive up the prices of everything purchased from abroad. Most routine jobs are being automated anyway. Nor is the answer to give tax breaks to the very wealthy and to giant corporations in the hope they will trickle down to everyone else. We've tried that and it hasn't worked. Nothing has trickled down.

Rather, the long-term answer is for us to invest in the productivity of our working people -- enabling families to afford health insurance and have access to good schools and higher education, while also rebuilding our infrastructure and investing in the clean energy technologies of the future. We must also adopt progressive taxes at the federal, state, and local levels. In other words, we must rebuild the American economy from the bottom up. It cannot be rebuilt from the top down.

Sugar Giants Shove Their Sweetener

by Chris Tenove

Jul/Aug 2003 Issue

What does anybody know about the sugar industry? The people who put the frosting on the frosted flakes keep a low profile and are happy when folks are too busy eating to ask a lot of questions. Now, though, a dust-up with the World Health Organization (WHO) has flushed them into the limelight, where they're pitting profits against public health.

The conflict was inflamed by a new set of dietary guidelines drawn from two years of research by the WHO and the UN Food and Agricultural Organization. The guidelines are part of a worldwide strategy to tame the swelling epidemic of obesity, diabetes, osteoporosis and cardiovascular diseases. One recommendation is that free sugars (i.e. sugar added to foods) should make up no more than 10 percent of our daily caloric intake. The sugar lobby reacted to that suggestion like a toddler asked to hand back his Halloween booty...

'It was particularly stupid for them to put in writing that they're going to try to get Congress to take away WHO's money,' says Michael Jacobsen, executive director of the Center for Science in the Public Interest. 'It gave consumers a chance to see the kind of bullying that is usually done behind closed doors.' [Adbusters]

The burden of spending

Over the 12 months to October 2007, home prices in the 20 largest metropolitan areas declined by 6.1 percent. And they have fallen every month since January. With less equity to borrow from, homeowners could cut their spending. As a second whammy, a large volume of adjustable rate mortgages are scheduled to reset to higher interest rates between 2008 and 2012. The burden of higher monthly payments could force households to reduce their expenditures too.

Economic growth and consumer debt are inextricably connected in the U.S. And it’s been that way for so long that it’s easy to forget why and what that implies.

Spending has outpaced personal income since the mid 1980s. Households saved ten percent of disposable income in 1985, five percent in the mid 1990s, and then nothing in 2005. (See chart 1, maroon series, scale on the left axis.)

Chart 1 (click to enlarge)

Low interest rates motivated the consumption ramp-up. Loose monetary policy played its part, but it would be incorrect to blame it all on the Fed. The massive accumulation of wealth by developing countries lowered the opportunity cost of spending, as Alan Greenspan has explained.

Interest rates motivated it, but the borrowing spree was made possible by innovations in the financial sector that increased the supply of debt. The introduction of the FICO score in the early 1990s improved the assessment of a borrower’s creditworthiness – or at least lenders believe so. By pegging interest rates to an index, instead of offering fixed rates, lenders transferred some financial risk to borrowers. Securitization of debt balances shifted some more of that risk off the lenders’ balance sheets.

The problem with a growth path based on borrowing and spending is that it has a natural end. An individual’s debt limit is determined by her creditworthiness, income capacity and collateral. That limit may be high relative to current income, and it may even be unknown to the borrower — after all, it’s up to the lender to draw the line. But once debt balances reach that limit, spending can grow only as fast as income (minus debt payments). Consumption is pinned to the vagaries of income. At the aggregate level, that means that economic growth is more vulnerable to unemployment and to the swings of the stock and real estate markets.

For instance, back in 2001 unemployment was rising, investment fell sharply, and share prices crashed. But overall the economy held up better than expected. Why? One explanation lies in real estate wealth. That year house prices rose by nine percent and consumers borrowed against home equity.

As a gauge of the current level of indebtedness, households now spend almost 15 percent of their disposable income on interest payments, including mortgages. (See chart 1, blue series, scale on the right axis.) If you include repayment of principal, the fraction of debt payments is much larger. Debt repayments are linked to interest rates, and hence subject to unforeseeable increases. Hence the worry about mortgage resets.

The main variables that determine spending and access to debt are outside the policymaker’s control. The cost of borrowing depends on the world level and distribution of savings. Lenders will continue to improve their assessment and management of risk, thus reducing the cost of credit. And central banks are capable of controlling inflation, but not of preventing asset bubbles or stimulating long-run growth.

But don’t despair: tax policy can mend our spending ways. First of all, do no harm. Tax laws can distort the cost of borrowing. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 partially addressed this issue by getting rid of the deduction for interest paid on consumer debt (credit card and uncollateralized loans). The deduction for mortgage interest should go next. I concede that there’s a (weak) case for subsidizing home ownership. But these days a house is much more than a place to live: it’s a piggy bank to draw from. There is no reason why the government should subsidize that.

Second, replace the personal income tax with a tax on consumption. A basic tenet of economics is that if you tax something you get less of it. An income tax punishes work. Instead, the government could levy a tax on the difference between income and contributions to savings. The new tax could be progressive, rather than flat, and could include personal deductions, just like the current personal income tax.

The main obstacle to those tax policies is political. The mortgage interest deduction is popular, and a consumption tax is still regarded as an oddity. No presidential candidate who actually cares about being elected would make such proposals. Perhaps in 2012, if the then incumbent president can afford it. Changing the nature of American economic growth is a cause worthy of spending political capital on.

Technorati tags: economics, consumption, consumer debt, consumer expenditures, economic growth

More Americans Expecting Recession in The Next Year

More Americans are expecting a recession in the next year. Consumers are waking up to the reality that the economy has a significant chance of recession next year.

The economic mood took a sharp turn for the worse over the past month, with 40 percent of Americans expecting a recession in the next year, according to a Reuters / Zogby poll released Wednesday.

That was a big rise from a month earlier, when 31 percent of the likely voters polled predicted a recession. The darker mood came as mounting concerns about housing and credit markets pounded Wall Street, and oil prices approached $100 per barrel.

That was a big rise from a month earlier, when 31 percent of the likely voters polled predicted a recession. The darker mood came as mounting concerns about housing and credit markets pounded Wall Street, and oil prices approached $100 per barrel. (CNBC 1/21/07)

Recession times are increasingly being expected. The coming holiday spending season will likely provide important clues to where consumer spending is headed. Consumer spending is about 70% of the US's GDP. Consumer spending is a key factor in a forecasting a recession.

A Second Stimulus: Much Bigger Than the First, and Focused on Infrastructure

It will soon dawn on Congress (although it may never dawn on the White House) that we need a much larger second stimulus package than is now being contemplated in order to give the economy the jump-start it needs and fill in for consumers who can't and won't spend more. My guess is that this second stimulus plan, including infrastructure, will ultimately reach $200 billion or more.

A special word about infrastructure spending. Not only is the nation sorely in need of it -- given deferred maintenance on roads and bridges, water and sewage systems, levees, and many of our ports, and the increasing need for public transportation -- but spending on infrastructure generates much more growth than cutting taxes. (This point, incidentally, was stressed in a paper earlier this year by Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody's Economy.com and, not incidentally, an economic advisor to John McCain.)

A Modest Proposal for Ending Socialized Capitalism

Socialized capitalism of the sort the Fed and the Treasury are now practicing, consisting of private gains and public losses, is untenable. On the other hand, it's also true that giant Wall Street investments banks as well as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are too big to fail. How to reconcile these conflicting principles?

Here's a modest proposal: When taxpayers insure a giant entity against loss -- as we now are with Freddie, Fannie, and Wall Street investment banks -- those entities must agree that:

(1) for the duration of the bailout, their top executives cannot receive total annual compensation higher than that received by the President of the United States, and

(2) the government gets five percent of their current valuation as shares of stock (roughly representing the benefit to their shareholders of the federal insurance) -- so that if and when the entities become profitable again, taxpayers are compensated for the risk they've taken on.

On inflation expectations

With Federal Reserve and government doing their best to stimulate demand, people have started looking at inflation. The worry is that the economy is not as sick as our policymakers think, and so the fiscal and monetary medicines are excessive. Markets disagree.

Expected inflation is an important determinant of future inflation. If the public expects higher inflation, workers demand higher wages, prompting employers to raise the price of their goods, which results in higher actual inflation.

Markets in fixed-income securities provide timely information about inflation expectations. Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS) deliver interest and principal payments that are tied to inflation. Payments from regular Treasury notes, on the other hand, are not indexed to inflation. The difference between the yield rates of the two types of securities must be equal to the inflation rate expected by the markets—otherwise there would be an arbitrage opportunity. In practice, because of technical issues, the yield spread is only an approximation to expected inflation, and people call it the break-even inflation (BEI) instead. (More on this below.) From here on I use BEI and “expected inflation” interchangeably.

Because the Treasury has created notes with different maturities, we can use the spread between nominal and TIPS securities to gauge inflation expectations for different horizons. For example, today’s difference between the yield of five-year TIPS and that of five-year nominal notes is approximately equal to the inflation rate expected over the five years starting now (2008-2012).

The Fed is interested in long-term inflation expectations, because in the short term prices are affected by transitory or volatile factors, such as commodity prices. One measure of long-term expectations, which we can also derive from yields, is the five-year, five-year forward rate. That is an approximation to the rate of inflation expected for the five years starting five years from now. Today, that would be the period from 2013 through 2017.

* * *

Chart 1 (click to enlarge)
Earlier this month Greg Ip of the Wall Street Journal posted a graph showing the five-year, five-year forward BEI, which generated some discussion in the econ blogosphere. Felix Salmon and Greg Mankiw worried over signs of increasing inflation coming from that graph. Mankiw went as far as saying that the rise in expected inflation is “consistent with the hypothesis that policymakers are overreacting to some economic news with excessive monetary and fiscal stimulus.” Following up on knzn’s analysis (Feb. 3), I find that the worries about inflation in the far-future are overstated—and that inflation expectations over the near-future have been overlooked.

Using knzn’s back-of-the-envelope method, I have produced my own time series of forward BEI, which matches the one posted by Ip quite closely (see chart 1). The graph shows that starting on January 15, the rate of inflation expected for the far future (2013-2017) started increasing abruptly. By the time Ip’s graph was produced, January 30, the forward BEI had increased by 16 basis points.

That is not unusual. We have seen increases of similar or larger size in 2007: between March 9 and March 27 (15 b.p.), May 26 to June 13 (25 b.p.), and between September 11 and September 20 (16 b.p.). But each of those spikes partially reversed over time. In fact, after September 20, the time series began a protracted downward trend that left expectations at the end of 2007 below their level at the end of the summer.

Chart 2 (click to enlarge)

Let’s zoom in on the picture (chart 2). Expected inflation for the far future, the forward rate, did rise in the second half of January. Interestingly, most of the rise happened between January 16 and January 22, perhaps fueled by discussion of the fiscal stimulus package (the President made a call for tax relief on January 18). I guess markets don’t have much faith on the fiscal discipline of the government.
More relevant to the immediate future of the economy: over the second half of January the spot BEI—the rate of expected inflation for 2008-2012—went down. Inflation expectations briefly increased after the January 22 rate cut. But overall, between the 15th and the 30th, expected inflation for the near future fell slightly.

On January 30th and subsequent days the spot BEI fell, which is quite exceptional, because it tends to increase every time the Fed eases—just look at the record in chart 2. In February inflation expectations for the near-future have continued to abate.


Chart 3 (click to enlarge)
Just in case the leaves don't let me see the tree, let me now zoom out and smooth out the time series (see chart 3). The recent rise in inflation expectations for the far future (the forward rate) to which Mankiw and Salmon referred, barely registers. In fact, those expectations have remained quite stable throughout 2007. On the other hand, expected inflation for the near future (the spot rate) started a downward trend in mid-2006. And January certainly didn’t put an end to that trend.

What do we make of this? Worries about an economic slowdown have been simmering ever since house prices began falling, back in 2006. They have intensified as the credit crisis unfolds. Much like knzn, I think that markets expect a deceleration of demand, and hence of prices. Generally speaking, monetary policy has not convinced the public that the slowdown can be avoided, and neither has the fiscal stimulus package. Regarding the far future, inflation expectations are contained.

Addendum: why isn’t the break-even inflation (BEI) equal to expected inflation?

Earlier I wrote that the spread between TIPS and nominal notes is only an approximation to expected inflation. Here I include a list of reasons why the equality doesn’t hold exactly. Please let me know if I miss something.

1. Compound bias
From the Fisher identity

i – r = pi + pi*r

By taking the spread between nominal (i) and real (r) interest rates, we ignore the interaction term pi*r. The BEI rate therefore overestimates expected inflation. If we take the yield on TIPS as an estimate of r, it’s easy to correct for this (just divide the spread by (1+r)). This bias, however, is tiny in the US nowadays, since interest rates are in the one to five percent range most of the time.

2. Inflation lag
Every day, the principal of TIPS is adjusted using the change in the Consumer Price Index. In principle, since the CPI is published only once a month, and with some delay, the adjusted principal would be updated using a lagged measure of inflation. Investors would require compensation for the difference between current and lagged CPI, and the BEI would overestimate (underestimate) expected inflation if lagged inflation were higher (lower) than current inflation.

In practice, we need not worry about this bias in the US, since the Treasury seems to have come up with daily inflation adjustments—I suppose by extrapolation of past CPI figures. Also, the bias is tiny, since monthly CPI increases are small, and not systematic, since the rate of inflation is not consistently increasing or decreasing month-to-month over long periods of time.

3. Protection against deflation
The principal of a TIPS is protected from deflation. At maturity, the investor receives the greatest between the original principal or the inflation-adjusted principal. Because this protection is valuable, the yield on TIPS is lower than otherwise, and the BEI overestimates expected inflation. In practice this bias is negligible, because the probability of deflation is extremely low.

4. Inflation risk
TIPS offer protection against inflation volatility. If investors are risk averse and inflation changes over time, TIPS are more valuable than securities whose value suffers from inflation risk. The yield will be lower, and the BEI will overestimate inflation expectations.

5. Liquidity premium
TIPS are less liquid than nominal notes. Because liquidity is valuable, the price of TIPS is lower and their yield is higher than if these securities were as liquid as nominal notes. For this reason the BEI underestimates expected inflation.

At times of high market volatility, some investors “fly” to liquid securities, in this case nominal Treasury notes, driving yields on those securities down, and introducing a negative bias to BEI as an estimator of inflation expectations.

6. Differences in the duration of the securities
In real terms, the payments from TIPS are constant, whereas the payments from a nominal note decline. The inflation-protected security has therefore a longer duration—sensitivity to interest rate changes—than the nominal security, with respect to the real interest rate.

Technorati tags:
economics, inflation expectations, expected inflation, inflation, TIPS

Googling "recession" from United States has Tripled in the Past Year

Graph of the number of times the word "recession" was googled from United States over the last year. As one can tell it has triple in the past year.

Setting the Record Straight on Playground Bullies

To set the record straight, I do not believe all playground bullies become right-wing Republicans when they grow up, nor do I think all right-wing Republicans were playground bullies when they were young. Nor, for that matter, am I at all convinced that left-wing Democrats are innocent of bullying, either as adults or when they were children.

I feel compelled to say all this because of a short interview I gave to Deborah Solomon of the New York Times Magazine, which was published last weekend. In it, I mentioned that I had been bullied when I was a youngster, mainly because I was very short. She then asked me "what do you think playground bullies grow up to be?" With my tongue planted firmly in my cheek, I answered "Right-wing Republicans."

For the last few days my email has been inundated with angry messages from self-defined right-wing Republicans, taking umbrage at my remark. Apparently they did not see the humor in it. A majority of the emails have been civil, but a large minority have been, well, how shall I put it? Filled with the sort of epithets and threats I last heard on the playground.

There Was a Reason They Called It... The Casino Economy

by Thomas Croft

02 Jul 03

In the last three years, a 'perfect storm' of rising energy costs, record consumer and corporate debt and massive trade and current account deficits joined with unsustainable investment practices, and resulted in an economic collapse. The first recession since 1929 to be primarily caused by over-investment, these 'collateral damage' investing schemes-in overseas boondoggles and sweatshops, extreme mergers, absurd dot-coms and derivative scams-all came home to roost. Enron used all of these investment tricks and more. The corruption scandals of 2001-2 completed the melt-down. Now, the world is probably in a double-dip recession, thanks partly to the scandal and continuing international disruptions.

The problem with casino bets and Russian Roulette is that somebody always loses. [CounterPunch]

There Was a Reason They Called It... The Casino Economy

by Thomas Croft

02 Jul 03

In the last three years, a 'perfect storm' of rising energy costs, record consumer and corporate debt and massive trade and current account deficits joined with unsustainable investment practices, and resulted in an economic collapse. The first recession since 1929 to be primarily caused by over-investment, these 'collateral damage' investing schemes-in overseas boondoggles and sweatshops, extreme mergers, absurd dot-coms and derivative scams-all came home to roost. Enron used all of these investment tricks and more. The corruption scandals of 2001-2 completed the melt-down. Now, the world is probably in a double-dip recession, thanks partly to the scandal and continuing international disruptions.

The problem with casino bets and Russian Roulette is that somebody always loses. [CounterPunch]

The fiscal stimulus: ineffective or wrong?

The latest economic data show that output growth has weakened and unemployment is creeping up. The government is worried, with good reason, that the economy is going through a pronounced slowdown, perhaps even a recession. To limit the damage, Congress yesterday approved a battery of fiscal measures. By my reckoning, however, the plan will at best provide a short-lived nudge to consumption, but not employment; at worst, it’ll do nothing.

Starting in May, the government will send $600 checks to individuals ($1,200 for couples and an extra $300 for each child). People who earn too little to pay income taxes, but make more than $3,000, will receive a $300 payment. Payments will total $106 billion and will add to the budget deficit.

Cash outlays are supposed to boost private consumption expenditures and accelerate overall growth. $106b may seem a small stimulus for a $14 trillion economy, but the payments are expected to have a “multiplier effect”: higher demand will prompt businesses to hire more workers, and increased employment will further stimulate private consumption, which in turn will induce more hiring. The process continues ad infinitum. The outlays, therefore, can have a final effect on aggregate demand that is many times bigger than the initial stimulus —hence the name “multiplier.”

The effectiveness of the measure hinges on two factors. First, the fraction of the government outlays that will be spent immediately. According to Bruce Bartlett, previous experiences with tax rebates in 1975 and 2001 indicate that it's small. The recent study by Elmendorf and Furman indicates that it's a 50 percent.

The second requirement, which has received less attention, is that businesses will respond to the initial surge in demand by hiring new workers. If they don’t, then the fiscal package will have no second-round impact on demand, and the stimulus to consumption will total just $50b.

Because the first two quarters of 2008 will be marked by considerable uncertainty about the course of the economy in the medium term, the announcement of the fiscal plan will not have an immediate effect on hiring. Manufacturers may ratchet up their inventories, in anticipation of the small jolt of demand in May, but they will do so by using overtime and temp workers, rather than hiring permanent employees. In the services sector, we won’t see any change in employment until the late spring, and even then employers will similarly meet spikes in demand with overtime hours and temp workers, at least initially. If, come June, forecasts have improved, we may see employment pick up over the fall. But by then the effect of the government checks will have played out. In conclusion, the fiscal package won’t provide any significant boost to employment.

A less obvious reason to reject the stimulus is that the slowdown in aggregate demand is necessary, even healthy. Most of the growth experienced between 2002 and 2006 was based on low interest rates, over-valued real estate, and loose lending standards.

Chart 1, from a story by Michael Mandel at BusinessWeek, tells it all. Mandel estimates that, “if consumer spending had tracked the overall economy over the past decade as it has in the past, Americans today would be spending about $600 billion less a year. The extra spending has amounted to a total of about $3 trillion since 2001.” That extra spending was financed with debt. Quite literally, Americans were borrowing their prosperity from the future —not exactly a sustainable growth path.

Chart 1 (left) and 2 (right). Click to enlarge.

The growth of productivity, the value of output per hour worked, confirms the hypothesis that consumer expenditures were out of line with real income gains, at least over the last five years. Robert Gordon of Northwestern University estimates that trend productivity growth peaked in 2002, and has slowed down ever since (see Chart 2, via Michael Mandel’s blog). The gap between long-term growth of GDP and consumption, on the other hand, has widened over the same period.

So, if the recent growth rate of expenditures was excessive, why is Congress rushing to prop it up? More importantly given that the stimulus will be financed with future tax increases: why are legislators borrowing even more from future prosperity? The answers to these questions have a lot to do with politics and very little with economics.

Notice the hodgepodge of enigmatic measures included in the fiscal package. Congress grants payments of $300 to low-income seniors and disabled veterans, but not to other disabled people. It allows federal housing agencies to insure jumbo mortgages, as if subsidies to the purchase of expensive homes was going to parachute the economy. And it includes specific provisions to prevent illegal immigrants from claiming payments, precluding illegals from contributing to the consumption surge, however small that may be. So, if you think about it for a minute, what Congress did is give itself a votes-buying package, which does stimulate something: re-election.

Technorati tags:
economics, macroeconomics, fiscal policy, fiscal stimulus, stabilization policy

Nouriel Roubini: "clear by now that a severe U.S. recession is inevitable in next few months."

Nouriel Roubini, a leading economist at New York University, is now saying that a US Recession is almost here:

"It is increasingly clear by now that a severe U.S. recession is inevitable in next few months. Those of us who warned for the last 12 months about a combination of a worsening housing recession, a severe credit crunch and financial meltdown, high oil prices and a saving-less and debt-burdened consumers being on the ropes causing an economy-wide recession were repeatedly rebuffed the consensus view about a soft landing given the presumed resilience of the US consumer."

"But the evidence is now building that an ugly recession is inevitable."

Roubini is a smart economist who often goes against the consensus view.

Phil Gramm's Upcoming Ambassadorship to Belarus

John McCain today announced his first foreign-policy appointment, should he become president. He will name Phil Gramm Ambassador to Belarus. McCain's decision apparently was precipitated by Gramm's insight into the American economy, when he said Americans were suffering from a "mental recession," and were "whining" about the economy. McCain obviously agrees with Gramm, because McCain himself said just a few months ago that a lot of the problems the economy is facing were "psychological" in nature. Just months before that, McCain said that the economy was making significant "progress."

But sending Gramm to Belarus may not reduce America's tensions with that part of Asia, or with Russia for that matter. Gramm may decide that Belarus is suffering from mental depression.

Recession buzz

Chart 1 (click to enlarge)

It’s been hard for news readers to avoid the word “recession” this January. The number of newspaper stories mentioning it has certainly been overwhelming (see Chart 1). Weak economic data might seem to justify the gloom. Growth has slowed down and the labor market has weakened. Still, we haven’t seen a single quarter of negative growth, and the employment figures have been equivocal, and certainly not recessionary. So, given what we know about the state of the economy, is all this recession chatter justified, or are journalists getting carried away?

To answer that question, I have put together data on the tone of economic reporting in the newspapers, as well as on indicators of the health of the real economy. Then I have estimated a statistical model and compared the level of pessimism of the newspapers with the actual mood that one would expect based on the known state of the economy. The results are pretty exciting. So exciting, in fact, that I plan on updating and reporting my calculations every month, here on EconWeekly.

My measure of usage of the word “recession” is The Economist’s R-word index: the number of stories containing that word in the New York Times and the Washington Post. The index is a surprisingly good indicator of economic slowdowns. It never fails to rise sharply at the beginning of recessions. (See Chart 2.) And in spite of its simplicity, it captures the sentiment of the newspapers pretty well. Mark Doms and Norman Morin, of the Federal Reserve Board, constructed a much fancier recession index for a research project on the subject, containing dozens of media sources and carefully filtering the search terms. And yet, the difference between their measure and The Economist’s R-word index is almost always small. (See Figure 4.1 in Doms and Morin’s paper.)

Chart 2 (click to enlarge)

To gauge the present and immediate future of the economy, I include the following variables in my statistical model: the unemployment rate, the growth of the S&P500 index, the growth of the price of oil, the growth of personal consumption expenditures, and the spread between the ten-year bond and the one-year Treasury bill. (Econometrics jocks can find the details of the statistical model below.)

My model shows that newspapers have indeed been too gloomy this past month. In January, known economic conditions would have justified about 200 stories mentioning the word “recession”; the actual count was around 300. Up until December, however, newspaper mood was approximately in line with the actual state of the economy. (See Chart 3.) Why did newspaper sentiment diverge from economic fundamentals last month?

Chart 3 (click to enlarge)

In January we witnessed a sequence of unusual events. There was ongoing talk about the fiscal stimulus package, which is being introduced precisely to avoid an economic slowdown. The President sketched a plan on January 18, then the House of Representatives announced theirs a week later, and then the Senate considered changing it. Then there was a mini crash in the stock market, followed by the surprise cut of the Federal Reserve’s target interest rate on January 22, and then another cut at the Fed’s scheduled meeting on the 30th. Every newspaper story that reported any of these events most likely included the word “recession.”

But, at least in part, I believe that the buzz has to do with incentives in the news industry. Even when reporting facts, every media outlet strives to agree with the views of its audience. Fox News would lose its parish if it started “showing” that the Iraq surge was wrong and ineffective, and the Wall Street Journal would clash against the opinions of its readers if it started “proving” that the Bush tax cuts were a bad idea. Maintaining an audience depends vitally on conforming to their prior expectations. (Note to self: what do EconWeekly readers expect?)

Economics reporting is a bit different because the state of the economy can be measured and verified more objectively. As a result, views are more homogeneous across audiences. Still, media outlets need to take into account three factors which determine the views news consumers, and therefore the choice of tone and volume of economic reports: intrinsic pessimism, past reports on the state of the economy, and reports from other media outlets.

Bryan Caplan of George Mason University has identified pessimism as one of the four capital biases of the average Joe. (Read this summary.) People routinely see negative trends in long-term living standards, wages, inequality, etc. The gloom extends to the state of the economy at any given moment. About half of Americans have been thinking that we are in a recession, or on the brink of one, since October! Where that pessimism comes from, I have no idea. David Hume, Caplan says, thought that “the humour of blaming the present, and admiring the past, is strongly rooted in human nature.” It sounds appealing. But whichever the reason, the media recognize the appeal of worrying reports about the economy —and deliver.

Inherent pessimism influences the interpretation that the media put on any given piece of hard data. But once the newspapers set clouds in the horizon, their incentives to deliver negative news become stronger, because they need to conform to the readers’ expectations. A newspaper that changed its view on the state of the economy would go against the prior views —plus, it would be accused of the horrible crime of flip-flopping. A newspaper has therefore an incentive to keep a certain mood even on something as relatively objective as the state of the economy. Past negative reports will lead to more negative reports in the future, feeding a cycle of pessimism, unless new hard data against such views are so strong that the paper is forced to tone it down over time.

Finally, people are exposed to reports from more than one source of information, even if it’s secondhand. Any newspaper that strayed from the average mood of all other newspapers would conflict with the established view, alienating itself. Any given outlet has thus an incentive to stay in line with the tone of all the major media, resulting in “herd behavior”: the tendency to base decisions (in this case the tone of the news) on the behavior of the rest of the community (other media outlets).

The combination of natural pessimism and the need to conform to the public’s views, therefore, explains why sometimes reporting on the economy is not consistent with actual events, as is the case now. Only policymakers, animal spirits and time can determine whether we’ll see a recession in 2008. For now, skip the editorials on economics.

Statistical model:
VAR, with monthly data, from January of 1976 through the latest month available. Each equation includes six lags. The variables are: the R-word index, the unemployment rate, the change in nonfarm payrolls, the slope of the yield curve (10-year minus 1-year), the growth of personal consumption expenditures on durable goods accumulated over the current and previous two months, and the growth of the industrial production index, also accumulated over the same period. I also include a set of monthly dummies and a dummy variable that equals 1 if the NBER announced a decline in real GDP. The unemployment rate is the first release reported by the BLS. The change in payrolls mimics the one reported by the BLS, that is, it is equal to the first estimate of payrolls for month t, minus the revised (first update) figure for month t-1. Both unemployment and payroll figures come from ALFRED. The yields on the ten-year bond and the one-year Treasury bill are monthly averages, from FRED. Durable expenditures come from the NIPA accounts, via FRED, and the industrial production index is from the Federal Reserve, also via FRED.

Technorati tags:
economics, news, media bias, recession, media

Economist: America's Vulnerable Economy

America's Vulnerable Economy

Fannie, Freddie, and the Pending Taxpayer Bailout

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two giant quasi-public housing lenders that together own or guarantee about half the $12 trillion in home loans outstanding, are heading into insolvency. No surprise. As housing prices continue to drop, more and more middle-class homeowners who got their loans from Fannie or Freddie are under water -- owing more on their homes than their homes are now worth. And as the economy continues to go south, more and more of them can't meet their loan payments.

While it's true that most of their home loans were made before 2006 when lending standards were tighter, that doesn't really matter because the rip-tide of this sinking economy is now hitting a much broader group of home owners.

Fannie and Freddie may not be technically insolvent yet, but I'm betting that if their lending portfolios reflected the true market prices of their loans they would be. That's why their own investors are bailing out.

So who gets stuck with the tab? Investors in Fannie and Freddie have always believed that the loans issued by the two giants were guaranteed by the federal government but technically they aren't. The guarantee has always been assumed but has never been put into law explicitly, and the liabilities have never been carried on the federal books. Yes, the companies' charters give the Treasury the authority to buy as much as $2.25 billion in each of their securities in the event of possible default, and the two companies have access to the Fed's so-called Fedwire payments system allowing them to access funding if needed. But these won't keep the two afloat for long.

As a practical matter, we're facing a Bear Stearns squared. Fannie and Freddie are way too big to fail -- especially now. There's no question the government will have to take over the companies, which means taxpayers will get stuck with the tab yet again.

Here we have another example of socialized capitalism. The executives of Fannie and Freddie have been among the best paid in all of corporate America. We're talking tens of millions a year in CEO pay alone. Fannie and Freddie are treated like giant investor-driven entities as long as they're healthy and their investors and executives are doing well. But when they start to go down the tubes they become public entities with public responsibilities, the rest of us have to bail them out.

On college endowments

According to a study released yesterday by the National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO), the endowment fund of Harvard University is worth $34.6 billion, a 19.8% percent higher than a year ago. 76 colleges and universities sit on endowments over $1b. Even more impressively, almost every one of the 733 institutions analyzed reports a double-digit increase in the value of its fund. (Look up the endowment of your alma mater here.)

Chart 1 (click to enlarge)

The increase in the value of the endowments has been the result of at least two factors: risk taking and stock market bonanza. First, higher-education institutions invest large portions of their wealth on high-risk, high-return securities. On a dollar-weighted average, in 2007 they held a 47.4% of their funds in equities, an 18.2% in hedge funds, a 5.4% in private equity, and a 3.6% on venture capital investments. Wealthier universities hold riskier portfolios than the average. (See Chart 1.)

Second, average stock prices have increased almost every single year for over 25 years. In spite of the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2000, the inflation-adjusted Dow Jones Industrial Average Index ended 2007 at a level five times higher than in 1982. Even the most passive portfolio manager would have achieved high returns in this stock market.

Chart 2 (click to enlarge)

No surprise then that most universities have performed so well. Over the last ten years, the return on most endowments beats the S&P 500 index, which grew at a healthy 7.1% annual rate itself. (See Chart 2.) In the case of the largest portfolios, universities beat the market by a long shot.

News of these fabulous riches has prompted some sectors to demand that universities share more of their wealth. Lawmakers remind them that, as tax-exempt institutions, “they’re supposed to offer public benefit in return for (that) exemption.” Private foundations, which are also tax-exempt, are required by law to spend 5% each year; the average for colleges is 4.6%, with little variation across levels of wealth (see data). Parents, on the other hand, don’t understand why tuition keeps going up while universities continue to amass wealth. Little do they suspect that the cost of college is stoked by the self-interest of parents and students themselves, not that of universities.

The classic explanation for the rise of tuition is that the college premium —the positive gap between the earnings of college graduates and high school graduates— has increased the demand for college education, thereby raising its equilibrium price.

More interestingly, the stock market has also made tuition rates go up, according to a paper* by my former colleague at the University of Chicago Pablo Peña (pdf). Rises in asset prices increase the amount of resources available to universities. Part of that wealth is spent on inputs that improve the quality of education: more and better qualified professors, and newer and more sophisticated facilities, such as labs, computers and libraries, for instance. Higher quality, in turn, increases the amount of human capital accumulated in college, and ultimately affects life-time earnings, i.e. the returns to education. Prestige considerations may be at work too: celebrity professors and state-of-the-art facilities increase the reputation of the institution, adding to the value of the diploma. Therefore, larger endowments spur the demand for college education, and drive up tuition rates.

Differences in the value of endowments across universities are vast: the combined value of the top ten colleges represents 35% of total endowment assets. In light of Pablo’s theory, the implications of this inequality depend on what universities and colleges spend their money on.

If they continue to use their wealth to improve the quality of the service they provide, demand for college education and tuition levels will continue to rise. Differences in tuition rates and education quality between top-notch and second-tier institutions will continue to widen too, since endowments and asset returns are highly concentrated. Also, because the ablest students —those with highest SAT scores or best records of achievement in high school— benefit the most from the quality of college education, the matching of the best students with the best institutions will intensify. Differences in the quality of students across colleges will increase.

On the other hand, universities could start using their endowments to increase capacity or subsidize the cost of college. In this unlikely scenario, the equilibrium price of higher education will probably decline, the quality of college education will drop, and the college premium —the earnings of college graduates vis-à-vis high-school graduates— will drop.

Selected institutions have recently been announcing that they will increase financial aid. Recent announcements might suggest that this could actually happen among selected institutions. Harvard and Dartmouth have eliminated loans from their aid packages and will be giving grants instead; and Yale has followed in their footsteps. These de facto cuts in average tuition rates are not going to change the system. First, they won’t change the quality of education at top universities, for which the foregone tuition revenue is peanuts. Second, they won’t reduce the cost of attendance of the average college student, because the number of institutions that can afford foregoing tuition revenues is small.

But improved aid packages at top schools will make their programs affordable to the brightest students, regardless of their financial situation. If the newfound altruism of the Harvards and Yales has any effect, that will be an even more pronounced assortative matching of colleges and applicants by quality. The scope of these developments is very limited, but it’s good news —at least for believers, like myself, in a free, merit-based education system.

More data:
Tuition rates: table of nominal rates (html), graph of real rates (pdf, Figure 1)

Technorati tags: economics, education, college, endowments, college tuition

Economy Slowing Says Calculated Risk

Great Blogger, Calculated Risk "Clearly the economy is slowing sharply"

The Wage Gap is being Fueled by the Gas Gap

In a society like ours is now -- in which most of the gains from growth are going to the top earners, and the very top 1 percent has about 20 percent of all income (and a far greater share of all wealth) -- almost every major issue has a large distributive consequence. But because economists and policy analysts, and the members of the media who follow them, are more used to thinking about efficiency than about distributional equity, these consequences are rarely discussed.

Consider gas. As I noted in yesterday's Times, the bottom half of the American work force ­-- everyone who will earn less than about $42,000 this year ­-- is getting hit by the equivalent of a whopping regressive tax in the form of soaring gas prices. And fuel isn’t a discretionary item like cable TV that can be cut from the family budget.

On average, Americans now spend 4 percent of their income on gas. But this figure varies significantly. People who live in impoverished Wilcox County in Alabama, for example, spend 16 percent of their income on gas, while residents of affluent Hunterdon County in New Jersey spend 2 percent.

Poorer Americans also tend to drive older cars that get lousy mileage. They don’t trade them in as often as wealthier people do, and can’t afford hybrids or new models that use gas more efficiently. And it’s not unusual for their jobs to require them to haul stuff from one place to another in pickup trucks or vans that guzzle even more gas.

Low-wage workers in rural areas are taking the biggest hit, but those who work in cities aren’t faring much better. It used to be that the very poor inhabited central cities and the working class lived in the inner suburbs, but now that the rich are moving back into town, the poor are being pushed outward. Retail, restaurant, hospital and hotel employees who work in upscale cities often must look 30 to 50 miles from their jobs for affordable housing. Their longer commutes mean they need to spend more on gas.

It’s true that those on the bottom half of the economic ladder make greater use of public transportation, but they’re having a harder time finding it. Budget constraints are causing states and cities to reduce rail and bus services. A survey of the nation’s public transit agencies released last month showed that 21 percent of rail operators and 19 percent of bus operators are cutting service.

The wage gap in America continues to widen. And the gas gap is giving it additional fuel.

Income mobility and education

As goats on a tree, reaching for the best leaves, we all strive to be the ones at the top. But even in America, the land of opportunity, only good climbers make it. And lately even the fittest seem to be having a hard time.

The table below shows the percentage of people who moved from a given group in the income distribution to any other one, between 1994 and 2004. (The data come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and the income measure is household taxable earnings.) The lowest degree of income mobility occurs among the poorest and the wealthiest: 58% of households in the bottom 20% of the distribution stay there, and 60% of those in the wealthiest quintile don’t move either.



Pooling people from all ages together, however, can be misleading. The typical earnings profile over a lifetime is hump-shaped: earnings start low, rise up until the individual is in her 50s, then begin a slow decline, and fall sharply with retirement. Because of this non-monotonicity, movements up and down the earnings distribution may have little to do with climbing the social ladder.

As an example: suppose the economy is populated by two individuals, one of whom is 35 and earns $45,000, and the other one is 55 and makes $75,000. So the older person is at the top of the distribution. Ten years later, the young individual has accumulated experience and earns $65,000, whereas the older person, now 65, has retired and doesn’t earn any labor income. The younger individual is at the top of the earnings distribution now. If we were oblivious to the age of these individuals, this two-person society would look remarkably mobile: the poorer person moved to the top and vice versa. In reality, the observed mobility is the product of the normal course of earnings over peoples’ lives.

The fortunes of a person are more likely to change early in life. Twentysomethings are less likely to be attached to a house, a family, or a job. They job-hop, experiment, go back to school. Over time, some people land a dream job —or a “comfort job”— and stay there. And some others simply grow roots: they have mortgages to pay, and spouses and kids to drag along. We also become more risk averse with age.

The data bear these intuitions: 67% of households whose head was between 22 and 29 in 1994 had switched quintiles ten years later; 54% of those between 30 and 39 did so, about the same as among the 40-49 age group.

Things get much more interesting when I look at mobility within education groups. Schooling is probably the single most important factor determining a person’s chance to “make it.” People with less education are less employable. They also experience smaller changes in productivity, so their earnings curve is less steep. And they have fewer opportunities to fill high-powered positions —the sort that provide a pay boost if one is successful. In this, however, the evidence doesn't support my expectations.

Between 1975 and 1985, and within the group of college graduates, 61% of households moved to a different economic class, whereas 59% of high school graduates were mobile -barely a difference. And twenty years later, 54% of college grads and 60% of people with a high school degree were mobile. (See chart.)

Click to enlarge


What made the economic ladder more slippery for college grads? Following the reasoning above, maybe people have less appetite for risk, and are taking jobs that are safer but also offer fewer opportunities to leap-frog over income classes. Starting up a business, for instance, is one of the riskiest endeavors one could pursue. But statistics show that animal spirits have not subdued —the fraction of entrepreneurs and self-employed has risen over the last 30 years.

A second explanation is that unobserved ability, not education, is behind opportunity. A couple of decades ago earning a college degree was a major feat. Only the well-off, highly-motivated and bright ever put their feet in a University. Nowadays going to college is almost a given. As a result a college degree has become a weaker signal of one’s competence. Highly capable individuals still get ahead, but the vast majority of college graduates do not belong to that breed.

Finally, but not less importantly, it might be a problem of too many grads chasing too few jobs with incentive-based pay. In spite of all the talk about stock options, the number of positions with (significant) variable compensation has grown more slowly than the body of individuals with a University diploma. More well-educated people land jobs without the power or the incentives to rise fast on the pay scale.

This calcification of the white-collar society is worrying. More and more individuals go to graduate school in order to earn that M.B.A., M.A., or even Ph.D., that will give them an edge over their peers. That behavior is perfectly rational, and yet self-defeating. The latest batches of college grads remind me of hamsters on a wheel rather than goats.

Technorati tags: economics, income mobility, inequality, income inequality, upward mobility